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 ABSTRACT 
INVESTIGATING PREDICTORS OF PREFERENCES FOR  
DELIBERATIVE QUALITIES OF POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS USING THE 
ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS 
 
 
David L. Brinker, Jr. 
Marquette University, 2012 
 
 
 This thesis presents a conceptual and methodological approach to researching 
preferences for political conversation.  The thesis contends that although real-world 
political discussion is not deliberative, insofar as it fails to satisfy the rigorous 
requirements deliberative theorists have laid out, the lack of empirical evidence is not 
cause to reject deliberation as a viable political theory.   
 To connect the theoretical and empirical, this thesis presents a “quasi-
deliberation” framework.  Quasi-deliberation, for the purpose of this thesis, is the state of 
political discourse shaped by the choices made when ideal deliberative qualities conflict 
in the real world.  Quasi-deliberation suggests that the differences between the real world 
and the theoretical are described by preferences regarding different qualities of political 
conversation.  These qualities, drawn from the deliberation literature (Moy & Gastil, 
2006) are “dominance during political conversation,” “clarity” of opinion expression, use 
of “reason, logic, and evidence,” and “understanding of other conversants' views” (p. 
448).   
 The thesis tests the exploratory supposition that these choices are predictable 
outcomes of antecedent political characteristics of respondents, using a nationwide online 
survey instrument distributed to the non-random membership of a website.  The 
characteristics measured in this thesis are culturally-informed worldview (Kahan, Slovic, 
Braman, & Gastil, 2006), attributes of personal discursive networks (Moy & Gastil, 
2006), and political information efficacy (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). 
 These three sets of measures are used as independent variables to describe the 
unique, discursively relevant characteristics of the respondent.  Each is then tested as a 
predictor of the relative priorities ascribed to each deliberative quality.  Saaty’s (1980) 
Analytic Hierarchy Process is used to create the dependent priority ranking variables.  
Respondents provide a preference for each quality vis-à-vis each other, producing a 
preference matrix, from which a single priority vector is derived.   
  The analysis shows that cultural cognition (worldview) and political information 
efficacy have some explanatory power over the variance in the priority rankings for some 
of the characteristics.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
 
 
 
 Deliberative democratic theory places discourse at the center of citizenship.  This 
is an appealing approach to citizenship because a discursive framework emphasizes an 
active and regular participation in civic life.  Yet, deliberative studies are criticized for 
apply a narrow standard for bona fide political discourse, allowing scholars to study it 
only in designed and controlled or institutional settings.  This is not an issue for those 
studying how deliberation functions as a political process on a micro-scale (i.e., 
deliberation as a process for individual decisions), but it is problematic when advocating 
a macro-theory that describes day-to-day citizenship.  This thesis proposes a method 
designed to address this issue by investigating how broader cultural values might drive an 
individual’s attitude about conducting general and common political talk.  Its goal is to 
advance deliberation as a theory of democracy that describes discursive citizenship as a 
form of political participation that is both interpersonal and cultural. 
 
Theories of Democracy: Liberal and Participatory 
 
 
 
 Deliberation tends to be classified as a theory of participatory democracy, 
competing primarily with liberal theory.  One of the more appealing aspects of liberal 
political theories, largely ingrained in the American political system, is how well they 
describe daily political life, where collective decision-making processes are generally 
adversarial (winner-take-all rather than consensus-based).  The liberal expectation of 
government is that it will protect personal liberty and private property, and so voting for 
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elected officials is generally the core duty and act of citizenship.  Deliberative theory 
must be able to offer a comparable norm for both group decision and individual political 
life if it is to be treated as a comprehensive political theory capable of standing with 
adversarial and liberal models.   
 
Deliberative Preferences 
 
 
 
 This thesis attempts to offer a method for studying how individuals relate to 
general political talk, measured in terms of deliberative qualities, with a focus on how 
deliberative preferences vary among individuals.  The four qualities selected for this 
study are drawn from an article by Moy & Gastil (2006), which identified four items used 
to measure the general deliberativeness of a respondent’s political conversations.  These 
four items conceptually represent theoretically-driven “aspects of deliberative 
conversation: dominance during political conversation,” “clarity” of opinion expression, 
use of “reason, logic, and evidence,” and “understanding of other conversants' views” 
(Moy & Gastil, 2006, p. 448).  Moy & Gastil (2006) found the items used to measure 
these aspects of deliberation divide well into discrete factors, each measuring a different 
aspect of deliberative conversation.   
 This shows that respondents understand the distinct meaning of each of these 
aspects.  Unlike the study by Moy & Gastil (2006), however, the use of the term 
“quality,” meaning an “aspect of,” is not used in this thesis to measure the overall 
“quality” of a deliberative conversation, in the sense of a ranking of goodness or badness, 
or an evaluation of “how deliberative.” 
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 Rather than investigating this  question of deliberativeness, this thesis examines 
how these aspects of a deliberative political conversation might be preferred to one 
another, and how the differences in those preferences are predictable by three predictor 
measures: cultural cognition (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil, 2006), attributes of 
personal discursive networks (Moy & Gastil, 2006), and political information efficacy 
(Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007).  These three measures indicate different aspects of 
an individual’s cultural, social, and personal relationship to political life.  Cultural 
cognition is operationalized as a measure consisting of scales measuring two sets of 
normative worldview propositions: the degree to which society should be structurally 
ordered (hierarchical versus egalitarian), and the influence that groups ought to have in 
social life (individualistic versus communitarian).  Discursive network information 
includes a person’s frequency of political discussion, the diversity of opinions and 
perspectives represented by the regular discussants within the personal conversation 
network, and the number of regular discussants.  Finally, political information efficacy 
(PIE) refers to the degree to which an individual feels he or she can competently employ 
his or her political knowledge and information to successfully participate in citizenship 
tasks (e.g., confidently electing public officials, participating in political discussions). 
 
Quasi-Deliberation: Rationale 
 
 
 
 Deliberative scholarship is largely defined by work developing the structural and 
functional aspects and the requisite qualities that would lead to discourse being 
considered deliberation.  This thesis aims to instead contribute to an approach that allows 
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political deliberative theory to more relate to an interpersonal political communication 
context, rather than a structural communication context.  These are sometimes treated as 
opposing camps; that is, deliberative theorists argue that most political communication 
fails to meet the rigorous requirements of true deliberation, while other scholars argue 
that casual discourse has value as political action even when it does not meet deliberative 
standards.  This thesis attempts to satisfy both by retaining deliberative standards for 
measurement, but examines individuals’ conversational priorities to explain the real form 
discourse takes when deliberation’s strict constraints cannot be satisfied in practice.  
 This thesis does not argue against strict definitions of deliberation or rigorously 
structured approaches to studying deliberation, nor does it argue that structured 
conversation does not matter.  It investigates conversational qualities of interest drawn 
from deliberative theory, in order to determine whether a culture-related explanation 
exists for individuals’ preferences for these deliberative qualities.  The overarching goal 
of this thesis, therefore, is to not to measure deliberativeness, but rather to gauge how 
participants differentially value deliberative conversation qualities. 
 The next chapter reviews literature related to democratic deliberation, including 
its background, definition, present sub-frameworks, and current research.  Chapter 3 
follows with the methods of data collection and analyses.  Chapter 4 presents the study 
results, and Chapter 5 interprets these results, and offers limitations and future research 
directions. 
 
5 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Deliberation is a composite political theory, influenced by both democratic and 
political communication theories.  The key purpose of the following literature review is 
to relate core concepts from both fields as an account of deliberative theory. 
 It should be noted that this thesis presents only a select account of deliberation’s 
theoretical grounding, and is not inclusive of all claims that have been made about the 
appropriate framework for deliberation.  The disparity of opinions and perspectives is one 
of deliberation’s most interesting features.  Despite the formulation of rigorous formal 
definitions and theoretical requirements for a discursive event to be called “deliberative,” 
most scholars also acknowledge that deliberation is an imperfect process.  James Fishkin 
(1995) argues that rather than describing an ideal state, deliberation “…is a matter of 
improving the completeness of the debate and the public’s engagement in it, not a matter 
of perfecting it” (Fishkin, 1995, p. 41, emphasis original).  Despite this sense of 
flexibility to make deliberation “work” in practice, there is substantial disagreement 
about what types of conversations qualify as deliberation, how deliberation ought to be 
institutionally implemented, and the actual outcomes of deliberation for participants and 
governance.  The thesis touches on these debates, but is more oriented toward relating 
concepts that drive the research questions presented later in this chapter. 
 The literature review begins by examining the use of the term “participatory” in 
democratic theory because the concept offers a strong background for deliberation.  This 
is an important first step, particularly in the United States, where the adversarial 
expectations of liberal democracy tend to dominate the public consciousness.  The efforts 
to outline deliberation as a unique theory will then be addressed.  In particular, it is 
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necessary to make clear what is required to call a political engagement “deliberative,” 
particularly with regards to formal aspects of public discourse.   
 The literature review also discusses two political science concepts examined in 
this thesis: cultural cognition (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil, 2006) and political 
information efficacy (PIE) (Kaid, McKinney & Tedesco, 2007).   
 Cultural cognition describes normative perceptions about the ordering of society 
in terms of two dimensions: hierarchy/egalitarianism, which indicates the social “grid”, 
or degree of social stratification, and individualism/solidarism, which indicates the social 
“group” concept, or the degree to which groups are important to social organization (as 
opposed to an individualistic social organization).  For ease of interpretation, cultural 
cognition studies have occasionally replaced ‘solidarism’ with the term 
‘communitarianism’ (Kahan, 2012), the term used in this thesis.  Originating from 
anthropology research, cultural cognition has been used to relate cultural contexts to 
political orientations.  In particular, social appraisals and perceptions are influenced by 
their salience to the personal cultural context.  This concept has been applied to 
differential perceptions of risks (e.g., HPV (Kahan et al., 2010) and gun control (Kahan et 
al., 2007).  It is applied here as a predictor of differential perceptions of the relative 
values of deliberative conversation qualities.   
 Political information efficacy (PIE) is a relatively new construct (Kaid, Tedesco 
& McKinney, 2004; Kaid & Postelnicu, 2005; Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco, 2007).  
PIE is a useful measure in political science for understanding how capably citizens are 
able to engage with politics by using political information for evaluative and 
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argumentative tasks, and has informed observable outcomes of interpersonal political 
discourse. 
 Following the discussion of cultural cognition and PIE, the use of experiential 
discussion characteristics for political communication is reviewed.  After addressing 
these background topics, the chapter transitions to a discussion of the concept of quasi-
deliberation. 
 
Participatory Democracy 
 
 
 
 Deliberative theory is fundamentally concerned with the importance of discussion 
and representation for a healthy democracy.  Roelof (1998) classifies deliberative 
democracy generally as a participatory model, competing categorically with liberal 
democratic theory and social revolutionary theory.  This chapter will address liberal 
democracy as a point of comparison because it is the theory containing the expectations 
of representative government with which many Western nations are most familiar.  For 
this reason, participatory democracy is best distinguished from liberal democracy because 
the latter is the theory with which it competes most for attention among scholars.  It 
should be clarified that this thesis is not presenting participatory and liberal democracy as 
mutually exclusive camps; rather, the distinction is a matter of understanding the 
emphasis that each places on the various expectations of government and of citizens. 
 As democratic theorist Robert Dahl (1979) observes, there is room for debate over 
whether all truly democratic theory is liberal, and over the flexibility (or specificity) of 
the term “liberal” itself.  He says, “… although liberalism is not necessarily democratic, 
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democracy must be liberal, that is to say, if it does not guarantee certain fundamental 
political and civil rights, then it is simply not democracy” (p 59).  This conception plays-
up the etymological notion of liberal and liberty: the Latin līber, meaning “free” or 
“unimpeded,” and also “free-spoken” or “frank” (Morwood, 2005, p. 106).  This freedom 
is either from restraint or, in an enlightenment sense, freedom from a government that 
explicitly adopts prejudicial preferences for certain groups of people.  Dahl (1979) 
observes that the term has “acquired a variety of meanings around the world.” (p. 59).  
He offers two definitions of liberal democracy: the general and broadly democratic 
meaning “rule by the people” (p. 59), and a set of three specific “criteria… for 
determining how collective decisions ought to be made in any association of equal 
persons.”  Those are, broadly, “political equality,” “effective participation,” and 
“adequate understanding” (p. 60).  These categories offer a helpful framework for the 
study of democratic theories.  The manifestations of these elements are not necessarily 
self-evident, and there is room for debate over how they ought to be best achieved.   
 Liberal democratic theory generally descends from the second of Locke’s (1956) 
Two Treatises of Government and has been developed by a number of famous scholars 
and works including Adam Smith’s (1776) Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations and John Stuart Mill’s (1859) On Liberty.  These theories argue, 
generally, that the purpose of a democratic government is to protect the ability of its 
citizens to pursue their private interests, particularly through the protection of private 
property. 
 Participatory models, including deliberation, compete with this self-interest 
version of the liberal perspective by emphasizing the role of the individual, not as one 
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who engages in self-interest for the betterment of society and whose interests must be 
protected by the state, but rather as a volunteer citizen.  This participatory citizen 
understands governance as a conscious social endeavor and seeks to actively and 
publically shape political discourse and state decisions through his or her advocacy.  
Roelof (1998) paints the distinction well: 
But note that the liberal democratic tradition interpreted this idealism as a 
call to a life of personal self-aggrandizement, whether material, or 
spiritual, or both. The participatory democratic tradition, on the other 
hand, sees it as a call to the individual to come forth gladly and enter and 
maintain a life of subjectively self-conscious membership in and with 
community. (p. 23) 
 
Participatory theories generally emphasize citizenship as an active and engaging 
endeavor, where the election of representatives is not an acceptable totality of citizen 
contribution to governance.   
 Pateman’s (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory is a seminal text on 
participatory theory.  Pateman (1970) identifies Jean-Jacques Rousseau as “the theorist 
par excellence of participation” (p. 22).  Rousseau’s (2002) reflections on citizenship in 
The Social Contract remain central to participatory approaches.  His democratic 
philosophy addresses a wide variety of facets of modern democratic thought including 
political interest groups, the function of voting as a safeguard against control by a single 
individual’s interests, and the importance of private property.  The distinctly participatory 
element Pateman (1970) highlights is Rousseau’s conception of active and public 
citizenship: 
Rousseau’s ideal system is designed to develop responsible, individual 
social and political action through the effect of the participatory process. 
… As a result of participating in decision making the individual is 
educated to distinguish between his own impulses and desires, he learns to 
be a public as well as a private citizen.  (pp. 24-25, emphasis added) 
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 Compared to liberal theorists, this conception of individual citizenship demands 
that citizens actively learn how to be members of a public, and intentionally actively 
contribute to the political system.  Conversely, the emphasis for liberal theory is not 
individual advocacy, per se, but rather a property-centric theory of government.  The 
United States Declaration of Independence famously contains this view, paraphrasing 
Locke’s (1956) position on the purpose and duty of government.  According to Locke 
(1956), “The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property” (p. 
110).  Therefore, citizens should abolish a government if it fails in this duty: 
Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule 
of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to 
grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power 
over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust 
they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite 
contrary ends. (p. 110, emphasis added) 
 
Here, a government (not necessarily a democracy) is commissioned by its citizens for the 
protection of personal property interests.  This concern over tyranny and liberty found a 
natural home in the document written to justify the American Revolution.  Participatory 
theorists depart from this perspective; they are more focused on Rousseau’s concern that 
citizens be able to operate efficaciously in public life than with Locke’s concern for their 
vulnerability to the abuses of government.  Allan Bloom’s keen introduction to a 
translation of Rousseau’s (1979) Emile, or On Education illustrates the departure point 
for participatory studies.  While Rousseau accepts much of Locke’s premise: 
He (Rousseau) differs only (from Locke) in that he does not believe that 
the duty to obey the laws of civil society can be derived from self-interest.  
Hobbes and Locke burdened self-interest with more than it can bear…. 
Civil society becomes merely the combat zone for the pursuit of power.  
(p. 5)   
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Achieving “intellectual self sufficiency,” as Bloom puts it (Rousseau, 1979, p. 27), 
through education is Rousseau’s reply to Locke’s functional self-interest.  He posits that 
one learns to live in a civil society, and this learning is the highest form (or stage) of 
education.   
 This more involved vision of citizen life raises practical questions about the 
mechanisms of participation.  Morrell (1999) offers relevant research-driven insights into 
the problems posed by a study of citizen democratic participation.  Morrell’s study is an 
inquiry into how different participation types and levels of involvement influence 
acceptance of collective decisions.  Morrell’s experiments established three groups with 
three classes of undergraduate university students, tasked with reaching a collective 
decision about “legalizing marijuana for medical use” (p. 304).  Each group participated 
in a collective decision-making procedure consistent with “liberal democratic 
procedures,” “strong democratic procedures,” and a control group with no procedure (p. 
303).  The liberal democratic group followed Robert’s Rules of Order, the standard 
procedural rules employed in most parliamentary settings.  Morrell (1992) created the 
strong democratic procedures, based largely on Crittenden’s discussion of “generative 
procedures” (pp. 11-14).  Morrell describes the generative procedure generally in four 
steps (p. 304).  First, participants engaged in “pooling the perspectives on an issue of all 
who wish to speak” without debate (p. 304).  Then, the floor was opened to a criticism 
phase, in which students could criticize a perspective, but only after they were “able to 
restate the perspective to the satisfaction of the one who offered it” (p. 304). This is a 
process generally known as position “mirroring.”  Third, the class entered a small group 
phase, where groups discussed and created a policy question that the whole group agreed 
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upon.  Finally, representatives of the small groups presented the group views and a vote 
was held, with the majority determining the outcome.  This was repeated over three 
separate experiments, with some differences in class composition and topic.  For the 
purpose at hand, those details are omitted, except for the relevant difference that the first 
two experiments were conducted over the course of a week, whereas the final experiment 
was conducted over a month and covered several policy decisions.   
 Morrell’s dependent measures were “collective decision acceptance,” “group 
satisfaction,” and “assumption reevaluation” (i.e., the degree to which the respondents 
reported that the process brought new arguments to light and compelled them to re-
evaluate their own positions).  Interestingly, these scores did not vary significantly 
between the two decision structures in the first two experiments.  However, in the long-
term experiment, the differences were substantial and contradictory to the hypotheses.  
While there was no difference in decision acceptance, statistically significant mean 
differences did occur for group satisfaction and assumption reevaluation; each was 
substantially higher in the parliamentary (liberal) condition than the in the “generative” 
(participatory) condition.  Morrell argues that this is because the generative condition was 
more personal than the parliamentary condition.  In the parliamentary condition, 
individuals were not separated from their arguments by a procedural barrier, but the 
generative process demands more personal involvement.  Morrell (1992) tentatively 
suggests that this result can be attributed to this personal quality of the decision-making 
design: 
The unique aspects of the generative procedures … tend to force 
participants to become more personally connected with the opinions they 
express.  The conflict… takes on a more personal nature, which can cause 
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participants to become defensive, less open to the suggestions of others, 
and less satisfied with the decision-making process. (p. 315)   
 
 Although Morrell’s project warrants more replication and examination, the vital 
take-away from the experiment is that participation is not a democratic panacea.  To 
make democracy institutionally “more participatory” hardly guarantees the process will 
result in better citizenship or better political decisions.  Deliberation can be 
conceptualized as an answer to the call for more precise investigations of the mechanisms 
by which citizenship might occur, but it does surely raise issues of its own.  These 
criticisms are the topic of the following section.   
 
From Participation to Deliberation 
 
 
 
 In a sense, deliberation is a participatory theory, because public discourse prior to 
public decisions plays a key role in all models of participatory democracy, even where 
policy-specific decision-making is conducted by those officials on behalf of the citizenry.  
Despite the overlap, deliberation is still a unique study within the participatory 
framework because it emphasizes a particular type of participation, insisting that 
democratic political decision-making ought to be an outcome of informed, rational, and 
un-coerced discourse among citizens.   
 This discourse-centered approach to civics has raised issues for deliberative 
scholars.  Many deliberative studies offer specificity, addressing Morrell’s (1999) 
criticism that “participation is not a monolithic construct that can be automatically 
assumed to take a certain shape.  Theorists who advocate greater citizen participation 
must take seriously the question of how often and in what way participation by citizens 
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should occur” (p. 314).  However, the operational considerations of these studies can be 
too specific to make sense in practice.  Hilmer (2010) offers a discussion of this primary 
criticism of deliberation, based largely on the efforts of deliberative theorists to 
distinguish the theory from participatory theory generally.  Hilmer’s account of the 
relationship between the theories argues that deliberative studies have “served to supplant 
participatory democratic theory” (p. 51, emphasis original), noting that, in some 
literature, the term deliberation is used to mean the operative action associated with 
participation.  This operational specificity makes deliberation a useful theory, offering a 
face to the participatory name.  Deliberation is uniquely interested in two theoretical 
lines: the conditions of public discourse, namely rationality and freedom from coercion, 
and the function of public discourse, namely to vet and validate public decisions.  Hilmer 
(2010) notes that these aspects lead deliberative theory to be overwhelmingly concerned 
with the “mode of participation” to the exclusion of the “sectors where deliberation 
occurs” (p. 52).  This distinction essentially points to the issue of the institutional nature 
of deliberation; indeed, deliberative theory is overwhelmingly concerned with formal 
institutions where deliberation can be observed and structured to conform to rigorous 
standards, for example in formal debates, jury deliberation, and deliberative polling.  
Hilmer (2010) poses a glaring criticism of deliberative theory that this thesis intends to 
address: 
Why not explore how the introduction of democracy into the workplace 
enables citizens to practice daily, rather than limit the analysis to how 
social networks formed in the workplace are injurious to democracy 
because they undermine deliberation? (p. 53)  
 
The workplace is only one example of a space where this criticism applies; yet, 
theorizing these spaces is difficult when maintaining consistency with restrictively 
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specific deliberative standards.  The purpose of the present study is to address this 
question by offering a conceptual framework (quasi-deliberation, discussed infra) and a 
methodological approach for studying deliberative features outside a formalized setting 
for political conversation.   
 After a brief overview of the basic definition and the tenets of deliberative theory, 
this chapter will transition to a discussion of deliberation involving two facets: theoretical 
developments and the efforts to study deliberation empirically. 
 
Deliberation – Introductory Overview 
 
 
 
 Deliberative studies are inquiries into expectations about the formal aspects of 
political discourse; that is to say, deliberation is concerned with procedural and social 
expectations that might define discursive political bodies.  Deliberative scholars may ask, 
for example, how representativeness is determined, what is required for citizens to 
competently participate in political discourse (Griffin, 2011), and how deliberation can 
become institutionalized in actual representative democracies (Hartz-Karp & Briand, 
2009). The degree to which consensus is a realistic, or even necessary, outcome of 
deliberation is debatable.  In general, leading scholars (e.g., James Fishkin, 2009; Gastil, 
2008; Jürgen Habermas, 1984) are primarily interested in the benefits of a conscientious 
communicative process.  Yet, all perspectives claiming to be deliberative must adopt a 
process and outcome-oriented expectation.  Rienstra & Hook (2006) offer a useful 
framing of deliberation in this sense: “Deliberative democracy is a procedural political 
view that seeks democratic legitimacy through the capacity of those affected by a 
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collective decision to deliberate in the production of that decision” (p. 315, emphasis 
added).  This statement offers a useful synopsis of deliberative theory because it 
highlights its two key aspects: the theory of deliberative action demands a fairly high 
degree of procedural rigor, and it emphasizes the primacy of actors’ discursive efficacy.  
This efficacy is operative both individually, in the sense that individuals must possess the 
skills and knowledge to reason and communicate effectively, and collectively in the sense 
that groups must be sufficiently represented to have their voices heard. 
 While these qualities are understood as generally deliberative, deliberation itself 
is difficult to define.  Gastil (2000) offers a widely recognized definition, focusing on the 
formal aspects of deliberation: 
 
Full deliberation includes a careful examination of a problem or issue, the 
identification of possible solutions, the establishment or reaffirmation of 
evaluative criteria, and the use of these criteria in identifying an optimal 
solution.  Within a specific policy debate or in the context of an election, 
deliberation sometimes starts with a given set of solutions, but it always 
involves problem analysis, criteria specification, and evaluation. (p. 22) 
 
Gastil (2008) also formulates what he terms a “shorthand definition”: 
 
When people deliberate, they carefully examine a problem and arrive at a 
well-reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consideration 
of diverse points of view. (p. 8, citing Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw, 
2002) 
 
Another useful and commonly-cited definition is offered by Chambers (2003): 
 
Generally speaking, we can say that deliberation is debate and discussion 
aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which 
participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new 
information, and claims made by fellow participants.  Although consensus 
need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected 
to pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of 
outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes 
deliberation. (p. 309) 
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These tentative definitions essentially capture a description of an idealized conversation 
for collective decision-making.  Often, when explaining deliberation, theorists find it 
useful to offer discourse qualities to illustrate what, at a minimum, ought to be present in 
order to call a conversation deliberative (these are discussed further in the section on 
empirical deliberative studies). 
 To provide an idea of what these qualities include, this section addresses 
deliberation by offering a brief narrative on the theory and developments that have led to 
modern deliberative theory.  Consistent with most deliberative scholarship, the section 
begins with a discussion of the significant theoretical contributions of Habermas (1984, 
1989) and Cohen (1989).  Discussing these scholars is a particularly good starting point 
because both emphasize a fundamental deliberative problem: how, in the context of a 
modern democratic nation, do individuals actually relate to the larger political mechanism 
in ways beyond the voting act, and how can individual acts of citizenship be accounted 
for in the larger task of collective governance? 
 
Deliberation – Theoretical Contributions 
 
 
 
 This section first briefly discusses Habermasian concepts, which are often 
invoked in deliberative studies.  This discussion lays the groundwork for the concept of 
discursive citizenship, and so is central to the justification for a discourse-centered 
democratic theory.  Cohen’s (1989) contribution is then discussed to give operational 
form to the deliberative theory, in particular by offering a set of criteria to differentiate 
deliberation and general political discourse. 
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Habermas, the Public Sphere, & Communicative Action 
 
 
 
Jürgen Habermas’ conception of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989) and his 
theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) guide the principles of deliberative 
theory.  He proposes the public sphere as a dedicated domain of rational-critical discourse 
within which citizens are divorced from their private-sphere attributes (and are thus 
equals as political speakers), and which produces un-coerced political consensus 
directing the implementation of public governance.  The public sphere as a critical model 
of deliberative democracy is premised on the historical decline of individual political 
efficacy in capitalist states and a corresponding rise of institutional (primarily private 
business) agency in shaping the discourse that, under deliberative models, guides the 
development of a democratic nation.  The democratic mechanism of the public sphere 
meets the social role of communication in the theory of communicative action, where 
identity and reason become public processes via communication.  The achievement of 
public reason is the central purpose of deliberation, and thus tends to deal mostly with 
institutions and structures of public conversation.   
Following the development of the public sphere, scholars working from the post-
structural perspective critically re-envisioned Habermas’s theory of the public sphere.  
Villa (1992) provides a useful summary of the particular concerns addressed in post-
structural revision: 
The first... I shall refer to as the power objection, which radically questions the idea(l) 
of a coercion-free space of deliberation.... The second objection, the epistemological, ... 
challenges the very possibility of a unified, consensus-based public realm in an age that 
has witnessed the death of legitimating metanarratives and the corresponding 
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fragmentation of the discursive realm into irreducibly heterogeneous language games.  
The third objection, the ontological, ...  question[s] the peculiar reality attributed to the 
public realm as a "common space of appearances" (Arendt), a world without 
transcendental or metaphysical support yet available to all its citizens/inhabitants. (p. 
712) 
Villa’s summary points to the general attempt of post-structural commentators to align 
public sphere theory with actually existing social communication structures.  In this spirit 
of practicality, they aimed to envision how non-rational-critical elements of society might 
be understood as constituents of a deliberative public environment, rather than 
designating them as categorical obstructions to it; mass media is the center of much of 
this work. 
In the Habermasian view, mass media competes and interferes with the 
deliberative activity of the public sphere.  To Habermas and proponents of the strict 
rational-critical discursive ideal, the media is, as Habermas (2006) explicitly 
characterizes it, its own sort of extortive power, distinct from political, social, and 
economic power (p. 419).  Post-structural re-envisioning, however, promotes a 
multidimensional notion of public spheres and accommodates mass media as a 
participant in them.  The development of this literature is important to this project not 
because of the media-studies angle, but because the focus on the “public sphere” reflects 
an overwhelming interest in how, if at all, individuals can have political efficacy in 
modern political power structures.  Deliberation is a response to this concern and calls for 
the engineering of political institutions that, by design, enable citizens to access and take 
an active role in public decision making. 
Public sphere critics also claim that Habermas’ conception requires people in a 
neutral space of public discourse to shed their unique perspective in order to reason 
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properly.  Yet, the work done by Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative rationality 
advances the need for understanding context-based individual communicative actions.  
The two-volume discussion of the theory is extensive and, owing largely to the 
difficulties of translating German philosophy to English, a taxing read.  However, there 
are a few enduring principles interwoven into the implicit logic of the deliberative ideas 
discussed through the remainder of this thesis.   
Habermas (1984) discusses the prospect of communicative action as a perspective 
that places language and communicative acts as the focal point for investigations into the 
coordination of social action (p. 274).  His analysis of language differentiates instances of 
actions following communicative acts.  He says, “I shall speak of communicative action 
whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric 
calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding” (pp.285-86).  Unlike 
the public sphere, which is institutional, communicative action operates at the 
interpersonal level.  Communicative understanding between people [Verständigung], as 
Habermas (1984) describes it, is contingent on both parties interpreting a speech act in 
the same way, both in terms of the manifest and action-related latent meaning (p. 307).  
He presents three ways a statement may be challenged.  For simplicity, they can be 
described as the normative rightness (is it right that the claim or statement be made), 
truthfulness (is the full meaning of the statement really as it has been presented), and 
existential (are the presuppositions of the statement experientially valid) objections.  This 
type of analysis is the precursor to deliberative efforts, which seek public discourse that 
allows participants to challenge a speaker in order to achieve understanding, as opposed 
21 
to adversarial challenges intended to win an argument, in terms of an audience’s or 
judge’s favor.   
This thesis is concerned with better understanding the role of preferences in the 
deliberative process, a concept derived from Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative 
action.  The theory accounts for individuals by claiming that the interpersonal negotiation 
of meaning is sensitive to personal experience; according to Habermas, “communicative 
action is dependent on situational contexts, which represent in turn segments of the life-
world of the participants in interaction” (pp. 278-279).   
Deliberation is not simply an operationalization of the public sphere, which has 
been depicted as a space for white-washed discourse by the critics summarized by Villa 
(1992, supra).  Rather, deliberative scholars should contextualize the political economics 
of the public sphere by understanding communicative action as the central Habermasian 
text, because, as Kim & Kim (2008) observe, deliberation is fundamentally about using 
discourse structures to build understanding. 
Cohen’s Deliberative Criteria 
 
 
 
Joshua Cohen (1989) is credited as the “first major theorist to specify criteria by 
which one might judge the democratic legitimacy of deliberation” (Mansbridge et al., 
2006, p. 4).  His list of criteria for deliberation are “freedom” of action and opinion, 
“reason” as the basic test of validity for contributions to discourse, “equality” of 
participants in terms of their ability to “contribute to the deliberation” (Cohen, 1989, p. 
23), and “consensus” as the goal of deliberation.  Subsequent criticism of the theory has 
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challenged most of these principles (see Mansbridge et al., 2006 for a good summary).  In 
particular, challengers reject the “rationality” requirement because its application in 
deliberative study tends to preclude the role of personal experience and emotion, both of 
which have value in determining public decisions (Sanders, 1997, Nussbaum, 1995). 
While Habermas (1989) and Cohen (1989) primarily contribute to the 
mechanisms and nature of public deliberation, the outcomes of deliberation have been 
elaborated considerably by literature addressing different approaches to conceptualizing 
the function of deliberation which are discussed in the next three sections of this chapter. 
Instrumental vs Dialogic Deliberation 
 
 
 
Gutmann (1987) argues that the skills to deliberate are critical to a “living up to 
the routine demands of democratic life” (p. 52).  By this, she means that citizens in a 
democracy are in a more challenging position than is often recognized; they are expected 
to follow and respect laws they have not necessarily individually consented to, yet are 
also expected to actively oppose, and occasionally to intentionally “disobey them, if 
necessary, with the intent of changing them by appealing to the conscience of the 
majority” (p. 52).  Consequently, Gutmann (1987) notes, the democratic responsibilities 
of citizens, and thus the ends of a primary education aimed at training deliberative 
citizens, are two-fold.   
Deliberation, on the individual level, is defined as “careful consideration 
with a view to decision” and, on the institutional level, as “consideration 
and discussion for the reasons for and against a measure by a number of 
councilors (e.g., in a legislative assembly).” (p. 52) 
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These are two functions of deliberation that require individual focus, although 
they are not necessarily procedurally or empirically distinct.  One suggests that, as 
individuals, people should engage in discourse and further a particular sort of discourse 
(rational-critical, free from coercion, etc) as part of their own efforts to engage in public 
reasoning.  This function of deliberation is distinct from the more popular concept of an 
institutional decision-making procedure (e.g., jury deliberation), having more to do with 
the learning and communicative experiences of the participants.  Kim & Kim (2008) 
characterize this distinction as “instrumental deliberation” vis-à-vis “dialogic 
deliberation,” where the instrumental concept is oriented toward procedural decision 
making, and the dialogic concept is oriented toward community building and public 
reasoning.  Deliberation, for Kim & Kim (2008), is largely grounded in Habermas’ theory 
of communicative action: 
The theory maintains that reason is not given from outside the society nor 
does it preexist in individuals’ subjective minds; rather, reason is to be 
produced by nonpurposive, nonstrategic, nonsuccess-oriented social 
interactions called communicative action.  Habermas regards rationality 
not as a pregiven logical necessity but as a collective construction 
produced by social interaction. (p. 54) 
 
Conceptually, from a Habermasian perspective, the notion of public rationality or public 
reasoning does not merely hinge on contributions of many individuals to a central 
discourse, but also exists in the sense that an individual’s reasoning can be public insofar 
as individuals can think about collective decisions beyond assessing their own self-
interest. 
 The following sections will treat dialogic and instrumental approaches as discreet 
categories, based on the primary focus of the thesis.  It should be clear from the overview 
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thus far, however, that the person and social implications of deliberation are generally 
understood as related and mutually supportive.  In practice, discourse is both a personal 
process for improving one’s own opinions and a collective process for improving group 
decisions. 
Dialogic Deliberation 
 
 
 
This notion of “representative thinking,” as Arendt (1968) terms it, is perhaps the 
most difficult point of contention between deliberative democracy and liberal democracy.  
The concept illustrates how dialogue can facilitate the achievement of internal public 
thinking: 
The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am 
pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and 
think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for 
representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my 
opinion. (p. 241) 
 
Yet, representative thinking is not necessarily preferable in a liberal adversarial model, 
compared to self-interested action.  This point is also where deliberative theorists have 
the most persuasive difficulty; after all, conceiving of good citizenship as the ability to 
act (e.g., vote, argue) in one’s own interest seems quite realistic, while the expectation 
that a citizen should forgo his or her interest in favor of the community seems fanciful. 
Yet, the notion of self-interest and representative thinking are not mutually 
exclusive.  Indeed, another term Arendt (1968) employs is “enlarged thought,” where 
considering the perspectives of others is both procedurally and morally desirable to the 
25 
individual democratic citizen.  Benhabib (1988) argues that this dialogic approach to 
citizenship carries both moral and practical implications: 
The moral principle of enlarged thought enjoins us to view each person as 
one to whom I owe the moral respect to consider their standpoint.  This is 
the universalist-egalitarian kernel of Kantian morality.  Yet "to think from 
the standpoint of everyone else" requires precisely the exercise of 
contextual moral judgment. (p. 43)  
 
Arendt writes from the post-war German Jewish perspective, and so is concerned with 
morality in citizenship as a response to the totalitarian regimes of the war.  Yet, the 
principle of her concept of representative thinking and procedural Kantian 
universalizability applies to all democratic theory.  Individual ethics and collective ethics 
are both involved with acts of citizenship.  The dialogic perspective on deliberation, then, 
is a form of political discourse that can improve citizenship.  Kim and Kim (2008) offer 
thorough coverage of how political science has shown democratic talk improves 
citizenship, identifying a number of scholars who “believe that talk provides people with 
the opportunity to think through their “idea elements” and reduce cognitive 
inconsistency, thus enhancing the quality of an individual’s opinions and arguments” (p. 
61). 
 
Instrumental Deliberation 
 
 
 
 Bobbio (2010) presents typologies for how individual participants relate to a 
discursive event in terms of their opinion outlook at the outset of a deliberation.  This is 
described in terms of a grid, where four positions are presented, representing two 
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dimensions: definitiveness (well-defined/ill-defined) and reflectiveness 
(reflective/unreflective) (p. 4).  These two factors - how certain a person is about a 
position and how thoughtful he or she has been on the reasoning behind his or her 
position - are proposed as dimensions to account for differences in the participants 
engaging in dialogic decision-making.  This is an important consideration for deliberative 
scholars.  As Bobbio (2010) observes: 
First and foremost, not all deliberative processes are equally capable of 
guiding participants toward a constructive and not manipulated dialogue, 
in view of achieving a common position. (p. 19) 
 
Bobbio thus emphasizes the implications of group composition, in terms of certainty and 
reflectiveness, on how collective decision-making as a process ought to be approached.  
For example, Bobbio (2010) suggests, a strategy of discourse centered on the 
participation of informational but neutral expert parties may be useful to groups 
composed of low-certainty participants, but may do little to facilitate a discourse among 
“people with strong convictions” (p. 20). 
 While the present proposed research does not employ certainty or effectiveness 
measures, it does attempt to measure differences in the starting positions of participants 
using cultural cognition measures.  Indeed, the idea that participants have varying 
preferences for deliberative features is an extension of research like Bobbio’s, which 
argues that researchers ought to address how individual features of participants might 
affect how deliberation serves as a decision-making instrument. 
 One helpful perspective on deliberation as an instrument of democracy is an 
exchange between political scientists Ian Shapiro (2006) and James Fishkin (2006).  
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Fishkin (2006) responds to a somewhat dismissive handling of deliberative theory in 
Shapiro’s book The State of Democratic Theory.  He claims to respond to three criticisms 
of democracy: that deliberative scholars have “a naïve faith that deliberation will lead to 
consensus,” “ignore the social context of decisions,” and “lack an empirical basis for 
their claims” (p. 73).   
 Shapiro (2006) advocates “competition over deliberation as a mechanism for 
keeping democracy honest. Its core ideal is argument not discussion” (p. 82). He argues 
that procedural deliberative approaches to democracy require substantial central 
coordination and orchestration.  This adversarial system is not intended to exclude 
deliberation; indeed, the aim of much of Shapiro’s work is how democracy can reduce 
domination of some groups over others, and he suggests deliberation can sometimes be 
helpful in this process.  In Shapiro’s view, indiscriminate institutional deliberation is 
more likely to produce corruption because designing agendas, assigning experts, and 
determining a neutral statement of facts and interests are all opportunities for 
institutionalized manipulation of opinion.  Indeed, Shapiro’s (2006) general argument is 
that the problem facing real-world democracy is not that argument is an ineffective form 
of political discourse for which an alternative is needed, but rather, that argument is not 
held openly and honestly because of issues like the two-party system and campaign 
financing (p.82). 
 The two central issues this thesis tracks from these arguments is whether 
consensus is necessarily the driving goal of deliberation, and the distinction between 
argument and discussion, particularly in terms of which is the more useful and productive 
form of public conversation.  This chapter has made particular note of Morrell’s (1999) 
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work on when democratic participation is constructive and when it discourages political 
participation and satisfaction, and Bobbio’s (2010) work on how the effectiveness and 
reasonableness of a deliberative design is subject to the nature of the participants.  The 
purpose of this thesis’ preference-based approach is thus to begin a theoretical conception 
of deliberation that serves participants even when they are not concerned with producing 
consensus and which can accommodate groups that are adversarial (argumentative) or 
collaborative (consensus-building).   
Deliberation – Empirical Studies 
 
 
 
This section reviews efforts to empirically measure deliberation and its effects.  
For the purpose of expediency, only studies relating directly to the present thesis are 
reviewed.  However, Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs (2004) and Mendelberg (2002) both 
offer an excellent overview of the past literature focusing on empirical studies of 
deliberation. 
 Two types of empirical studies are discussed here: those that investigate the 
outcomes of deliberation, and those that investigate a deliberative event itself; both 
concepts are relevant to the focus of this thesis. 
Measuring the Outcomes of Deliberation 
 
 
 
Studies based on Fishkin’s (1995) deliberative polling model have returned 
encouraging results for deliberation researchers.  Of primary interest are gains in 
participants’ factual political knowledge (Luskin et al., 2000), opinion generation and 
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change (Luskin et al., 2002), and political efficacy (which is related to political 
participation in general). 
Karpowitz et al. (2009) find that designed issues forums, organized events for 
bringing citizens together to conduct structured and professionally moderated public 
discourse about salient political topics, can improve political knowledge and efficacy, can 
improve evaluations of decision legitimacy, and “can [allow participants to] consider a 
diversity of viewpoints rather than falling into groupthink and polarization” (p. 576).  
Cobb’s (2011) analysis of a national issues forum on technology also showed knowledge 
improvements and internal efficacy improve during deliberation, but notes that because 
deliberation is a time and resource intensive process, it may not be the most effective way 
of engaging citizens in political decision-making.  
Nabatchi’s (2010) analysis of an organized deliberative event shows participants 
experienced a sustained increase in external political efficacy, which is a term for 
perceptions about the government’s responsiveness to the public’s opinion and the 
individual’s ability to influence public officials), but no significant change in internal 
political efficacy, which is a term for perceptions about the respondent’s own ability to 
engage with politics.  This effect was again measured two years after participation and 
found to persist, although the author notes that the deliberative town hall session did 
demonstrably affect increases to school funding and citizen opportunity for oversight 
(Nabatchi, 2010, p. 34).  Clearly, this outcome improved respondent efficacy, and, thus, it 
is not necessarily the case that the deliberative process itself was responsible for the long-
term increase.  
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Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger (2009) find that participants in a deliberation who 
express more dissention or disagreement in the conversation are neither necessarily more 
inclined to avoid discussion, nor to give negative evaluations of the process.  Instead, 
they find that, regardless of the respondent’s position, when respondents report higher 
satisfaction with the deliberative process, they also report higher “intent to participate in 
future deliberations” and an increase in “perceived legitimacy of deliberators’ policy 
choices” (p. 187).  The authors also report that “perceived reevaluation of personal 
opinions also increased reported motivation to participate in the future” (p. 187).  
Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger (2009) conclude that a participant’s evaluation of a 
deliberative process itself is important in their intent to engage in future deliberations, 
and their assessment of the ultimate decision’s legitimacy.   
While the present study is not empirically investigating a specific deliberative 
event, it does seek to assess the preferences of individuals when it comes to deliberative 
qualities.  These preferences may well be related to how a participant might evaluate a 
particular deliberative event.  Thus, Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger (2009) offer important 
support for the rationale behind this thesis because the questions they raise may help 
answer these evaluation questions in future applications.  For the present thesis, 
evaluations of deliberative events are not employed.  However, understanding the 
qualities that distinguish deliberation from general discourse is central to the proposed 
research questions because these are the quality categories between which respondents 
are expected to display differential preferences.  Studies that measure those conversation-
level qualities are reviewed in the next section. 
 
31 
Measuring the Features of Deliberation 
 
 
 
Stromer-Galley (2007) undertakes the considerable task of creating a coding 
scheme for full deliberative conversations.  Galley’s key coding categories are Reasoned 
Opinion Expression (Disagreement and Elaboration), Sourcing, Equality, Engagement, 
and Topic.  While the procedural work on the coding scheme is impressive, here the key 
is how Galley operationalizes deliberative engagement into these moments.  Each aspect 
is very difficult to actually measure; for example, “equality” is measured by the time and 
words each participant contributes to the conversation, even though, theoretically, 
equality is more a matter of equitable presentation of perspectives and mutual respect for 
each position than a matter of the literal time spent discussing each perspective. 
While Stromer-Galley (2007) uses content analysis, a survey-based study by Moy 
& Gastil (2006) employs similar measurement of deliberative features.  Moy & Gastil 
(2006) examine requisite characteristics of deliberative, democratic discourse and 
correlate characteristics of interpersonal networks (or 'spheres') (e.g., network 
heterogeneity, media use) as antecedents to the occurrence of those qualities in everyday 
interpersonal conversations.  Their self-reported measurement of deliberative 
characteristics – power, clarity/directness, and the use of logic/reason – are similar to 
those gathered by Stromer-Galley (2007), but are indicated in self-report form by 
respondents.  These measures are useful for measuring deliberative attitudes.  Moy & 
Gastil (2006) suggest that deliberative conversation outcomes are different from the 
outcomes of conversation in general: 
32 
Not all conversations contribute equally to sound political judgment… we 
distinguish problem-solving face-to-face conversation from that which is 
simply sociable. Whereas social conversation tends to occur between like-
minded others and has no real goal, problem-solving conversation is 
essentially public and can take place among people of different values and 
backgrounds. In this latter model, speaking to others can generate sound 
judgment and ultimately lead to good government, which presumably 
focuses on the common good. (p. 444) 
 
Discursive political engagement is thus not treated as a uniform behavior.  Moy & Gastil 
(2006) use predictor variables: Conversation Networks, Media Use, Political Knowledge, 
and Efficacy, as independent variables expected to influence multi-item measures of 
deliberative “criterion variables” - Dominance During Political Conversation, Clarity, use 
of Reason, Logic, and Evidence, and Understanding of Other Conversants’ Views.  The 
present thesis differs from their study because it does not attempt to predict likelihood to 
engage in deliberative conversations.  Rather than using the deliberative criteria to 
indicate how deliberative those conversations are, this thesis is interested in which 
deliberative criteria are most important to respondents vis-à-vis each other. 
 
Quasi-Deliberation – A Conceptual Bridge 
 
 
 
 Quasi-deliberation is a concept referring to acts of actual discursive citizenship, 
where deliberation is the gold-standard, but not necessarily expected.  Citizenship is 
important to deliberation because these acts mobilize the political lives of citizens, 
whether they are framing political topics, forming or expression opinions, or making 
decisions.  Ideally, deliberation is both an interpersonal process and a process of 
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collective governance.  But ideal deliberation happens very rarely, if ever.  Quasi-
deliberation, therefore, allows the study of ideal deliberation as it is perceived by citizens.   
 Deliberative scholars tend to claim their work is focused on public discourse as a 
mode by which citizens might actively engage in their own democratic self-governance.  
The works of the most prominent deliberative scholars show a strong intention to focus 
on the citizen.   
James Fishkin’s (1991) book on deliberation introduces itself by centering on citizenship: 
This book is about how to bring power to the people under conditions 
where the people can think about the power they exercise. (p. 1)  
 
Likewise, Joshua Cohen’s (1989) definition is participant-oriented: 
 
By a deliberative democracy I shall mean, roughly, an association whose 
affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members. (p. 17) 
 
John Gastil (1994) also makes a point of highlighting the prime importance of citizens in 
any consideration of deliberative democracy: 
No matter how it is defined, inclusive deliberation must involve the 
citizenry.  Thus, the citizen becomes the centerpiece of the democratic 
ideal and efforts at democratic reform. (p. 3)  
 
Surely, there is good reason for deliberative studies to treat the individual citizen 
as the ideal unit of analysis.  Yet, most empirical studies focus on samples and groups 
from designated and designed deliberative events, rather than studying daily citizenship.  
This is not accidental, nor necessarily a shortcoming.  By defining deliberation with a 
strict set of conditions, one must treat citizenship at-large as generally non-deliberative, 
with only intermittent instances of natural or designed deliberative citizenship.  However, 
deliberative scholars should also consider the need to study how deliberative elements are 
experienced in everyday citizenship outside of the designed institutional political setting. 
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To do so, deliberation should be understood as an ideal concept that exists 
imperfectly in the world.  Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw (2002) make reference to this 
concept: “The political theorist Robert Dahl and others have defined democracy as 
something that nations can reach only by degrees” (p. 400, citation omitted).  Likewise, 
the suggestion that a real-world deliberative study ought to focus on the real-world 
preferences of individuals is not a radical call for revision of the core deliberative 
expectations, any more than a look at citizens in a real-world democracy rejects the 
expectations of democracy.  Just as any real-world democracy is an approximation of an 
ideal state, informal political discussion also occurs daily in a quasi-deliberative form. To 
examine a quasi-deliberation, then, is to examine the deliberative-ness of a practice.  
Understanding a state’s political regime as quasi-democratic or a conversation as quasi-
deliberative acknowledges the role of priorities in shaping actual, if imperfect, 
democratic and deliberative forms.  Priorities and preferences are the pragmatic means 
through which people resolve conflicts when theoretical qualities manifest in actual 
practice.   
 To illustrate this preference perspective in the democratic context, one might 
consider an example of how selecting between democratic preferences can shape quasi-
democratic states, using the example of compulsory voting.  Some democracies, Australia 
for example, as well as several countries in South and Central America, maintain a policy 
of compulsory voting in federal elections (though one can vote “present,” or cast a blank 
ballot), while the United States and most European nations do not.  The compelled voting 
policy satisfies the participation needs of a democracy, and so protects an important 
quality of a democracy – “representativeness.”  Despite the importance of 
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representativeness, this policy is not universally adopted in democratic nations.  In the 
United States, this practice is more likely to be viewed as compelled political action (or 
speech).  Americans are apprehensive of compulsory political speech mandated by the 
government, treating it as the “the ‘flip side’ of … prior restraint” (Teeter & Loving, 
2011, p. 99).  This strong opposition to compelled speech leads to a de-emphasis of 
“representativeness,” but in favor of a competing democratic quality – “individual 
freedom from coercion.”  This need for freedom from coercion conflicts with the need for 
representativeness, thus presenting an instance where two qualities of a democracy are, 
for practical purposes, mutually exclusive.  Ultimately, which one is selected over the 
other is a matter of preference.  This comparison of voting policies generally presents an 
example of how preferences can explain a manifest difference between two quasi-
democratic states.  The need to choose between ideal qualities is the essence of quasi-
democracy; in a theoretically ideal democracy, voting would be both ubiquitous and 
voluntary.  Likewise, this thesis assumes that individuals harbor deliberative preferences 
that represent choices to be made in order to maintain acceptable levels of discursive 
rigor for a range of conflicting conversational factors.   
 
Interpersonal Political Discourse from a Social Scientific Perspective 
 
 
 
 Informal political talk is used in social scientific effects research, and is generally 
found to correlate with political participation and knowledge variables.  Interpersonal 
discussion has been found to be a predictor of political engagement (McLeod et al. 1999).  
Eveland & Hutchens-Hively (2009) investigate political discussion in terms of 
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“frequency,” “network size,” and network “heterogeneity.”  They find that talk variables 
predict levels of political knowledge and participation, with the caveat that discussions 
with like-minded individuals (“safe discussions”) predict more political participation, 
while “discussion diversity is negatively related to participation” (Eveland & Hutchens-
Hively, 2009, p. 219).   
 Pan, Shen, Paek & Sun (2006) also study talk by establishing the relationships 
between three civic engagement variables: media use, campaign involvement, and 
political talk.  From The authors find support for a model that argues campaign 
engagement and civic engagement are related by political discussion as a mediator.  
However, the authors provide little detail about what sort of political talk they referring 
to.  The talk variables employed are “whether they ‘discussed politics’ with their ‘family 
or friends,’ and if ‘yes,’ ‘how many days in the past week’ they ‘talk(ed).’”  The survey 
also collected the respondents’ specific relationships (spouse, relative, etc) with those 
conversation partners. 
 Pan et al (2006) acknowledge these measures are not the strongest, and it does 
seem that a fairly obvious critique here is the tautological nature of the variables.  If one 
is active in a presidential campaign, it seems likely that one will talk about it.  Indeed, the 
presidential campaign in general is a common topic of discussion.  Is political talk merely 
any instance of talking about a politically-related topic?  The authors’ operationalization 
of the “political talk” concept seems a little broad for their purpose.  The authors contend: 
The overall point is that election campaigns matter not only in their ability 
to influence individuals’ levels of information, attitudes, and vote choices, 
but more importantly in their capacity to activate and mobilize political 
talk among citizens. Seriously examining such talk among citizens during 
election campaigns does not need to impose an a priori model, using it to 
screen “nondeliberative” from “deliberative” political talks. It does require 
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us to see an election campaign as a collective deliberation and to evaluate 
it accordingly. (Pan et al., 2006, p. 340, citation omitted)  
 
To work around their vague handling of “talk,” the authors claim to conceptualize a 
campaign as inherently a process of “collective deliberation.”  They argue that a political 
campaign is itself a deliberative context, and therefore any engagement with it is an act of 
engaged deliberative citizenship.  This is an arguable conception.  Considering the 
showmanship and celebrity components of political races, it is important to distinguish 
the democratically relevant components of campaign talk from other talk about politics.  
In the news media, “politics-as-celebrity gossip” seems to displace useful analysis of 
candidates.  Further, the sound-bite style of political conversation seems to serve only as 
a re-affirmation of existing ideas without the sort of subjection to competing ideas that 
the authors believe is endemic to campaign talk.  For these reasons, it seems that a model 
like deliberation must be imposed in papers addressing political talk, rather than 
attempting to broaden the definition and scope of deliberation itself.  The deliberative 
conversation qualities discussed above lend themselves to variables that represent a 
narrower conception of political talk.  These conversation qualities, drawn in operational 
form from Moy & Gastil (2006), are specific elements that may be useful for examining 
the nuanced preferences for the nature of political talk, rather than its mere frequency. 
 
 
 
 
Cultural Cognition 
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Political discourse is influenced by a variety of considerations.  Conover & Searing 
(2005) write:  
Most treatments of deliberation focus solely on its dialogic nature , and therefore 
assume that citizens are motivated to discuss by particular political desires and 
informational needs: to gain political information, to express their issue positions 
and candidate preferences, and to persuade others … However, it is quite 
apparent… that other motives also seem to strongly stimulate everyday talk. … 
Hence, social motives may be much more important than we have assumed. (p. 
40) 
 
 From this starting point, Conover & Searing (2005) provide a comprehensive 
review of motivations to engage in political conversation, which generally fall under 
political expression (e.g., persuading others), social (e.g., learning about other people and 
identifying common ground), personal identity (e.g., politics as self-expression), and 
civic reasons (e.g., creating a healthier democracy and being a good citizen).  This thesis 
does not incorporate these motivations explicitly.  Yet, it is clear from Conover & 
Searings’ (2005) research that to understand individual participation in discourse, one 
needs to consider how to contextualize individual “starting-points” for deliberation, and 
how these might be measured.  Cultural cognition is the conceptual framework by which 
this thesis attempts to do so. 
Douglas (1970) is the originator of the group-grid worldview concept, which 
captures sociological concepts originally intended to express dimensions of social 
structures.  The group dimension indicates the degree of community influence and 
identification, while the grid dimension represents the element of centralized control, or 
primacy of rules.  Douglas originally used these measures to describe a social situation, 
but not the reasons for it (political or social or otherwise). 
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The relevance of Douglas’ cultural cognition measures became clear with her 
work with Aaron Wildavsky, on Risk and Culture (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  This 
work applied Douglas’ cultural theory to policy analysis.  The study found that people 
assess risks based on which ones are most likely to compromise their lifestyle, or more 
specifically, which are most detrimental to their position on the group-grid quadrant.   
This work greatly expands the capacity for political researchers to understand 
culturally-driven political preferences.  Gyawali (2002) credits the cultural theory of risk 
with allowing researchers “to move away from the dualistic straitjacket of either 
individualistic free market or bureaucratic socialism by accepting that two other 
solidarities – the egalitarianism of committed activism and the resigned fatalism of the 
masses – also play crucial roles in any socially dynamic process…” (p. 25).  In other 
words, the grid-group construct allows a more rounded view of political life than typical 
political “left” vs “right” (or in the United States, Democrat vs. Republican) variables. 
Political Information Efficacy 
 
 
 
The notion of self-efficacy (Campbell et al., 1954, Bandura, 1982) has proven an 
integral concept for numerous studies and models of political engagement (e.g., Caprara, 
Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009), and is one of the underpinning concepts in 
Bandura’s social cognitive theory (1986), which has been employed in a myriad of 
studies and subsequent models (e.g., Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior, 1985).  The 
concept has also been used in deliberative studies comparing self-efficacy and “group 
efficacy” (Gastil & Dillard, 1999, p. 186).  However, as a research measure, it has also 
proven overly broad for many applications.  As the concept’s progenitor, Albert Bandura 
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(2006), has observed, “There is no all-purpose measure of perceived self-efficacy. … in 
an effort to serve all purposes, items in such a measure are usually cast in general terms 
divorced from the situational demands and circumstances” (p. 307).  For the present 
investigation of political talk, “political information efficacy” (PIE) is a useful set of 
more specific questions to measure the specific contribution of an individual’s ability to 
use of information to engage with politics.  Its early authors differentiate it from general 
internal efficacy “in that it focuses solely on the voter’s confidence in his or her own 
political knowledge and its sufficiency to engage the political process” (Kaid, McKinney 
& Tedesco, 2007, p. 1096).   
The measure is fairly young, and has primarily found application as a media-
information measure, particularly in the online space (Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 
2011, McKinney & Rill 2009, Sweetster & Kaid, 2008, Tedesco, 2007) and televised 
debates (McKinney & Chattopadhyay, 2007).  PIE has been proposed as a predictor of 
voting likelihood, among other civic engagement variables.  It has been investigated as a 
factor in explaining the age-gap in political efficacy, because it provides a conceptual 
bridge between changing media types and generational political differences in 
information seeking and political affect (e.g., cynicism, Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 
2011, Sweetster & Kaid, 2008).  
Researchers have also used PIE to investigate differential effects on information 
processing resulting from the selection of sources of information (Lariscy, Tinkham & 
Sweetster, 2011, p. 753).  While these information sources have often been studies in a 
media context, the present thesis is an opportunity to investigate PIE as a predictor of 
preferences.  Conceptually, its inclusion helps answer what aspects of deliberative 
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conversation might be more or less preferable to a person with high confidence in, and 
availability of, personal political knowledge.  In other terms, does an informed voter 
prefer different elements of a political conversation?  The answer could position PIE as 
an informative mid-stream variable in a more complex political discourse model in a 
future study.   
The prior discussion on deliberation’s scholarly ancestry also contributes to an 
understanding of PIE as a vital component in understanding how individuals discuss 
politics.  While The Social Contract is perhaps Rousseau’s (2002) primary contribution 
to participation, his work Émile, or On Education (1979), addresses how education 
allows individuals to function in political society.  For Rousseau (2002), functioning in a 
society is not an inherent competency – indeed, the demands of social life are at odds 
with the natural dispositions of people.  Access to knowledge is therefore, at least in a 
deliberative framework, key to how citizens experience and participate in political life.  
This thesis examines one component of political life – discourse – and therefore has 
cause to subject it to the individual’s knowledge state as an independent variable. 
A Habermasian rationale also applies to the use of PIE.  Habermas provides a 
rationale for deliberation as a study of how people relate to a system of political 
discourse.  Knowledge is surely one key factor with influence over a citizen’s ability to 
engage in political actions and engage with political discourses. 
 
 
Need for Cognition 
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 Need for cognition is also a key variable for some studies.  Delli Carpini et al. 
(2004) notes that “individuals who score high on the “need for cognition” … are more 
likely to participate in deliberative discussions and to generate valid arguments” (p. 326, 
citing Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, Cacioppo et al. 1996, Shestowsky et al. 1998).  It is not 
included in this thesis, however, because the construct tends to function as a piece within 
well-established structures and models, backed by extensive research and hypothesis 
testing.  The present research is not prepared to offer such a comprehensive model, but 
hopefully that is one future direction for this line of research. 
Research Questions 
 
 
 
 This chapter has outlined the broader justification for the research questions 
advanced by the present thesis.  The main points of the chapter support three research 
questions, which guide the original research component of this thesis.  Habermas (1984, 
1989) offers a rationale for discursive citizenship – that is, the reaching of understanding 
through rational-critical discourse.  Cohen (1989) offers criteria by which this sort of 
discourse might be measured.  The discussion of the distinction between instrumental and 
dialogic communication offers a framework for distinguishing the collective/functional 
and the interpersonal/cultural aspects of deliberation.  Finally, empirical studies offer 
operationalizations of the qualities first presented by Cohen.  With this background in 
mind, the notion of quasi-deliberation helps frame an empirical approach to studying 
actually existing deliberative elements of political discourse.  Quasi-deliberation 
accomplishes this by focusing on how preferences for qualities of ideal forms may be 
related to other real-world political considerations.   
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 This study is specifically interested in predicting the variance in individual 
preferences for conversational qualities.  The predictors are cultural (cultural cognition), 
experiential (discursive network characteristics), and functional (political information 
efficacy) orientations that might affect citizens’ approaches to political discourse.  Three 
research questions are examined. 
 Assuming that differences in respondents’ rankings of the qualities represents real 
preferences: 
RQ1: What is the relationship between cultural worldview variables and 
deliberative quality rankings? 
 Assuming that respondents’ interpersonal discourse experiences may influence 
their preferences for deliberative qualities: 
RQ2: What is the relationship between discursive network characteristics and 
deliberative quality rankings? 
 Assuming that self-perceived availability of and ability to use political 
information may influence respondents’ preferences for deliberative qualities: 
RQ3: What is the relationship between political information efficacy and 
deliberative quality rankings? 
These research questions serve to establish the usefulness of the suggested approach to 
studying how personal preferences for the formal aspects of deliberation influence other 
political preferences.  Eventually, this may lead to a broader model surrounding 
deliberative preferences that describe individual expectations of governance or 
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government processes.  The next chapter discusses the methodological component of the 
thesis research.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
Method 
Sample 
 
 
 
Three hundred questionnaires were collected from an online respondent pool.  
The online platform used for distributing the questionnaires, discussed below in further 
detail, is administered by Amazon.com and composed of registered users who accept a 
variety short tasks presented in .html format in exchange for small monetary 
compensations.  The questionnaire and informed consent information were posted to the 
task marketplace and accepted by the website’s membership, which remains anonymous 
by the use of unique user identification numbers.  Users completing the survey received 
$1.00 in compensation. 
Of the collected responses, three cases were eliminated because they bore the 
redundant respondent identification numbers (i.e. three respondents completed the survey 
twice in different waves), and two cases were eliminated because of bad data, where the 
respondent marked the same reply for every question.  Execution of the validity-check 
case-dropping procedure (discussed below) resulted in 48 dropped cases, leaving a final 
sample of N=247.  
The collected sample somewhat over-represented non-Hispanic whites at 83.4%, 
compared to the national representation of 72.4% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).  Those 
identifying as black and African American represent 6.5%, Asian or Pacific Islander 
6.1%, Hispanic 2.4%, and American Indian 0.8%.  Highest level of education was 
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distributed as 10.9% achieving a high school diploma (or equivalent), 25.1% completing 
“some college,” 46.6% holding a two-year or four-year college degree, and 16.6% 
holding a graduate degree.  Most respondents were between 30 and 50 years old (53.6%), 
32.6% were younger than 30, and 13.7% were older than 50.  The distribution of sex was 
50.6% male, 49.4% female. 
Political philosophy was measured on a 1-5 scale from liberal to conservative; 
49.8% of respondents identified as somewhat or very liberal, 29.1% as moderate, and 
21.1% as somewhat or very conservative.  The largest political group affiliation was the 
“other” or no affiliation group, with which 49.1% of respondents identified.  Of those 
affiliating with one of the two major political parties, 39.3% identified as Democrat and 
20.6% as Republican.  The three groups were tested for variance in political philosophy, 
measured by a 5-point scale from liberal to conservative.  All groups returned significant 
differences in means (F2,244=11.90, p>.001).  The Bonferonni post-hoc showed the 
“other” group is more conservative than Democrats, with a mean difference of .673, but 
compared to Republicans, the difference was a much larger -1.419.  In other words, 
members of the “other” group were found to be closer to Democrats than Republicans on 
a liberal-conservative scale, with a mean of approximately 2.5, with Democrats averaging 
about 2 and Republicans averaging about 4.   
Instrument 
 
 
 
Data were gathered using a survey. The survey was executed online using the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), a versatile web-based task platform that is becoming 
increasingly common for academic survey distribution because of its cost effectiveness 
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and demographic diversity (Mason & Suri, 2012; Bohannon, 2011).  Marquette 
University’s Institutional Review Board reviewed and granted exempt status for the 
proposed survey research (protocol number: HR-2313). 
 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
The following sections discuss the key measurements employed in this study.   
Dependent Variable: Measuring Quality Priorities with the AHP 
 
 
 
This thesis measures individual priorities when choosing between qualities of 
deliberation.  To conduct the relative ranking of the decisions, it borrows a technique 
from Saaty’s (1980) Analytic Hierarchy Process.  The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
is a method for assigning weights to decision factors in complex multi-criteria decisions.  
Preferences are assigned on a pairwise basis to each of the decision criteria, meaning 
every criterion is compared to each other.  The resulting preference matrix is then 
consolidated with a weighting estimation method.  An illustration of this procedure is 
included as Appendix 3.  While using the right eigenvector as a priority vector is the most 
precise and mathematically preferable method of determining weights, other methods like 
least-squares and the arithmetic mean are used as well for expediency.  This study 
employs geometric means as a weighting method, which has successfully been employed 
as an estimation method in AHP studies (Katsumura et al., 2008).  Unlike the eigenvector 
method, the geometric mean method does not account mathematically for inconsistent 
responses (that is, a set of rankings where some seem to contradict others, i.e., when a>b, 
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b>c, but c>a).  This issue has been addressed in this thesis by adding a question to the 
survey reversing one preference set; comparing this question to its opposite, the ranking 
should reverse.  This method ensures a sufficiently consistent set of responses.  The 48 
inconsistent cases dropped by this procedure is a considerable number.  The dropped 
cases were not predicted by any demographic or response variable, except for the time to 
complete the survey.  The mean completion time for the inconsistent cases was two 
minutes shorter than the average completion time, which suggests that the inconsistency 
is a characteristic of rushed and inattentive responses. 
The decision factors in this study are deliberative qualities borrowed from Moy & 
Gastil (2006).  The survey includes pairwise comparison items to generate a single list of 
weighted preferences for four deliberative qualities (see the attached codebook and 
survey for these items).  This treatment of factors is an important distinction from other 
studies, where normative “goodness” and “badness” are implied by the authors’ 
evaluation under the expectation that each quality is a test of the “deliberativeness” of an 
exchange.  Rather than this directional approach, where conversations are “more” or 
“less” deliberative, this study uses weights of the factors to establish how respondents 
prioritize the deliberative components when compelled to prefer some over others.  It is 
this relative prioritization, not the “amount” of a quality, which ultimately distinguishes 
respondents.  Conceptually, the variance in political talk preferences acts as an expression 
of normative expectations from citizens, rather than an a-priori standard, which citizens 
either meet or fail to meet.  The geometric mean ranking method results in four factor 
preference weights, which sum to 1, each decimal representing the degree to which that 
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item is preferred relative to the others.  The “distance” between decimals is significant 
insofar as it increases to represent a stronger preference over the other factors. 
 
Independent Variable: Cultural Worldview  
 
 
 
 The proposed research advocates treating deliberative qualities as preferences that 
vary by respondent.  The key to this project is to establish variance in deliberative 
preferences, but arbitrary variance is not valuable.  Therefore, the Douglas’ (1970) well-
established group-grid worldview concept has been utilized as an independent variable, 
with the notion that variance in a respondent’s position on the cultural cognition quadrant 
will significantly explain the variance in the deliberative quality rankings.  This study 
uses cultural cognition scales, as reported by Kahan (2012). 
 This widely-used cultural cognition measure is composed of a “group” scale 
measuring an “individualism-communitarianism” (or individualism-solidarism) 
dimension and a “grid” scale measuring a “hierarchy-egalitarianism” dimension.  
Cultural cognition is most commonly used as a predictor of risk perception (see Kahan et 
al., 2007, Kahan, 2012).  Responses to these scales have performed successfully as 
indicators of risk perception, with high internal consistencies (α > .70) (e.g., with Kahan 
et al., 2007, returning alphas greater than .80 on both dimensional scales).  The scales are 
appropriate to the sort of analysis potential employed in this study.  According to Kahan 
(2012): 
Psychometrically speaking, the scales should be thought of as measures of latent 
or unobserved dispositions, for which the items that make up the scales are simply 
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observable indicators. Because the scales are continuous, they lend themselves 
readily to correlational analyses (including multivariate regression) in which their 
influence can be assessed without the loss of statistical power (and the potential 
bias) associated with splitting a sample into subgroups. (p. 10, citation omitted) 
 
Thus, the cultural cognition scales are a useful variable for this study because they offer a 
somewhat more dynamic image of citizen’s political outlook than measures such as party 
affiliation or dualistic conservative/liberal political ideology, though both will be 
included as controls. 
 
Independent Variable: Discursive Network Characteristics 
 
 
 
The three discursive network characteristics examined in this thesis were drawn 
from Moy & Gastil (2006) to measure the contribution of regular political discourse 
habits to the variance of the conversation quality preferences.  These characteristics are 
frequency of political conversations, homogeneity of deliberative networks, and number 
of regular political discussion partners.  Frequency is measured by the item: “On average, 
how often do you talk about political topics with your family, friends, neighbors, and 
coworkers?”  Homogeneity is measured by a five-point agree/disagree Likert item: “I 
usually discuss politics with people of the same ethnic, social, and economic background 
as myself.”  Number of partners is measured by an open numeric entry question: “How 
many family members, friends, neighbors, and coworkers do you regularly discuss 
politics with?”  
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Independent Variable: Political Information Efficacy 
 
 
 
Four political information efficacy items (Kaid et al., 2004, Kaid et al., 2007) 
have been used to measure the respondent’s self-perceived ability to use his or her 
political knowledge to perform citizenship tasks.  They are: “I consider myself well-
qualified to participate in politics,” “I think that I am better informed about politics and 
government than most people,” “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the 
important political issues facing our country,” and “If a friend asked me about the 
presidential election, I feel I would have enough information to help my friend figure out 
who to vote for.” 
Controls 
 
 
 
Five-point Likert-type questions have been included to independently measure 
respondents’ perceived importance of each conversation quality.  Interest in politics in 
general is measured by an item from Sturgis & Smith, (2010): “How interested would 
you say you are in politics?”  Finally, the survey also collected standard control variable 
data for political party affiliation, political philosophy (liberal-conservative), education, 
age, sex, race, and income. 
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Procedures 
Coding & Analysis 
 
 
 
Data gathered from the surveys are analyzed in light of the research questions.  
Internal consistency of the cultural cognition and political orientation variables was then 
assessed by Cronbach’s alpha.  
Respondents’ pairwise comparisons of the four deliberative qualities (discussed 
supra) results in a priority ranking where the sum of the ranks equals one, and the 
distance between rankings reflects the magnitude of preference.  Thus, they can be used 
on their own as continuous variables, or can be converted to two (high/low) or three-level 
ordinal variables (i.e., such that the two-level groups represent those above and below the 
sample mean). 
The research questions are analyzed using Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient tests.  The Pearson “r” correlation tests linear relationships between variables.  
Because the dependent variables in this thesis are rankings, the non-parametric 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s “rho”) may appear a better option.  
However, while the dependent variables are referred to as rankings, this is true only 
insofar as they reflect preferences over each other.  They are, however, more akin to 
continuous variables in their distributions, and the research questions lend themselves to 
linear relationships.  This is because the fundamental question for these questions might 
be phrased “does the variance in the independent variable(s) explain the variance in the 
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dependent variable(s)?”  The linear Pearson “r” test is appropriate for this type of 
directional question, as opposed to the monotonic relationships that Spearman “rho” is 
designed to identify.  However, the Spearman results are included in the appendix, 
although they are similar to the Pearson results (because a perfect linear relationship is 
also a perfect monotonic relationship, but not vice-versa).   
While multiple regression techniques may be appropriate for future applications, 
this chapter is focused on the research questions, which seek to establish whether the 
AHP method can successfully establish deliberative preference rankings.  The 
investigation of more complex models or applications of the preference rankings using 
multiple independent predictor variables is reserved for future studies.  However, Chapter 
5 does contextualize the results using regression techniques. 
For RQ1, Pearson “r” correlation tests were performed between the cultural cognition 
variables and the deliberative quality rankings to test what association, if any, exists 
between cultural worldview and deliberative priorities. 
For RQ2, Pearson “r” correlation tests were performed between the discursive network 
variables and the deliberative quality rankings and cultural cognition variables to test 
what association, if any, exists between network characteristics and deliberative 
priorities. 
For RQ3, Pearson “r” correlation tests were performed between the summated political 
information efficacy measure and the deliberative quality rankings to test what 
association, if any, exists between respondents’ self-perceived ability to use information 
for political engagement and their deliberative priorities. 
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Validity Check for Preference Rankings 
 
 
 
Establishing the validity of the pair-wise deliberative quality ranking approach is the key 
outcome of this study.  Its employment in more elaborate models is one potential 
application for future research.  Validity is protected through a fairly rigorous case-
dropping procedure.  While only six pairwise comparisons were necessary to create the 
4x4 preference matrix, a seventh item was included for validity purposes.  With this extra 
variable, two pairwise weighting variables (values; .25, .5, 1, 2, 4) presented the same 
pair of statements for “use of reason” and “non-dominance,” in opposite orders.  Thus, 
the extra item is the reverse of one of the observed comparisons.  The case-dropping 
procedure was achieved through the creation of a new variable in SPSS, for which “0” 
means “do not drop” and “1” indicates a drop case.  A valid case has values on opposite 
sides of the scale, or in the case of a neutral opinion (“1”), no value at either extreme, 
while a dropped case was one in which the response to both opposite variables was the 
same or adjacent.  For example, if the response to the comparison of “use of reason” 
versus “non-dominance” is .25, indicating that reason is less important than non-
dominance, but the response to “non-dominance” versus “use of reason” was also .25 or 
.5, then that case was dropped.   
Instrument Validity Check 
 
 
 
 The survey was distributed in five waves, and two versions of the survey were 
distributed with the items re-ordered.  The presentation of the pairwise comparisons was 
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also re-ordered to ensure the instrument is not predisposing the ranking results.  ANOVA 
showed no significant differences between the waves and the preference rankings, and a 
t-test showed no significant difference between the two survey versions’ mean preference 
rankings for any of the qualities. 
The following chapter discusses the results of the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 The analysis shows some significant linear correlations between the dependent 
predictor variables and the quality rankings.  Two of the qualities, clarity of opinion 
expression and comprehension of opposing views are significantly related to the cultural 
cognition variables (RQ1).  The other two qualities, non-dominance and use of reason, 
are significantly related to political information efficacy (RQ3).  The second research 
question returned little interesting information, at least for the present thesis. 
 
Validity Indicators 
 
 
 
 Overall, the reliability and validity of the key items were found to be acceptable, 
as is discussed in the next few sections of this chapter.   
Preference Ranking Case-Dropping Procedure 
 
 
 
 After a manual check for duplicates and bad data (e.g., cases in which the 
respondent marked the same response for every item), the dataset was subjected to the 
moderately strict drop protocol discussed in chapter three.  The procedure resulted in a 
useful sample of N=247, or 82.3% of the collected responses. 
Cultural Cognition 
 
 
 
 The cultural cognition scales showed excellent internal consistency.  After 
reversing the appropriate items, the Hierarchy-Egalitarianism dimension returned a 
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Cronbach’s alpha of .910, and the Individualism-Communitarianism dimension an alpha 
of .923.  Consistent with theoretical expectations, the two dimensions are positively 
correlated (r=.757, p<.001), such that as respondents become more hierarchical, they 
become more individualistic. 
A Bonferroni post-hoc from ANOVA showed that the mean scores on both 
cultural dimensions differ significantly by about 1 point (on a 1-5 scale) between those 
identifying as “Republican” and “Democrat.”   This suggests that Republicans are more 
likely than Democrats to be more individualistic and hierarchical.  A significant 
difference also occurred between “Independent” and “Republican” and “No Affiliation” 
and “Republican” groups, presumably related to the finding that these “other” groups 
were more liberal-leaning. 
Political Information Efficacy 
 
 
 
 The four political information efficacy (PIE) items returned an acceptable internal 
consistency (r=.892), and were summed into one PIE factor. 
Preference Ranking Variables 
 
 
 
 The conversational quality priority vectors did not distribute the top rankings 
evenly.  The number of respondents ranking each quality most important is summarized 
in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Respondents Ranking Each 
Quality Highest 
  Frequency Percent 
Use of Reason 132 53.4 
Comprehension of  
Opposing Views 
42 17 
Non-Dominance 21 8.5 
Clarity of Opinion 9 3.6 
Tie 43 17.4 
Total 247 100 
  
The distribution of the rankings is reasonably well distributed for all but the non-
dominance quality rankings. 
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The mean non-dominance priority ranking is considerably lower than the other 
conversation qualities, and is skewed significantly to the right.  Interested readers should 
note that the author did attempt to correct for that skewness.  It was initially high at 1.655 
(the others were .572, -.163, and .326).  A base-10 logarithmic transformation of the 
variable reduced the ranking variance to .465.  However, using the resulting variable in 
subsequent analysis yielded no substantially different result than the ones presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Distribution of Rankings 
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Investigated Relationships 
 
 
 
Research Question One 
 
 
 
 The first research question asked, “What is the relationship between cultural 
worldview variables and deliberative quality rankings?”  The results are summarized in 
Table 2. 
 A Pearson “r” test indicates that the priority ranking of clarity of opinion 
expression is significantly positively related to both the Hierarchical-Egalitarian and 
Individualist-Communitarian scales (r=.156, p<.05 & r=.140, p<.05), while 
comprehension of opposing viewpoints is negatively correlated to both dimensions (r=.-
.278, p<.001 & r=-.273, p<.001).  This suggests that hierarchical individualists (both of 
which are correlated with conservatism and related to identification with the Republican 
political party) give higher preference to ‘clear expression of viewpoints’ than do 
egalitarian communitarians.  The preference for ‘comprehension of opposing views’ 
correlates in the opposite direction, decreasing as respondents become more hierarchical 
and individualistic.  The ranking for ‘use of reason’ and ‘non-dominance’ are not 
correlated with either cultural cognition scale variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
Table 2: Correlations between Cultural Cognition and 
Conversation Quality Rankings 
Quality 
Rankings  
Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism 
Individualism-
Communitarianism 
Non-Dominance 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
0.039 0.044 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns p = ns 
Use of Reason 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
0.107 0.110 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns p = ns
1
 
Clarity of 
Opinion 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
0.156 0.140 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .05 p < .05 
Comprehension 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
-0.278 -0.273 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .001 p < .001 
 
 This pattern is supported by the correlations between the quality rankings and the 
“political philosophy” item as well, which asked respondents’ to identify on a 5-point 
scale from “liberal” to “conservative.”  Neither non-dominance nor use of reason return 
significant linear relationships, while comprehension of opposing views is negatively 
correlated with the political philosophy scale (r = -.266, p < .001) and clarity of opinion 
expression approaches a significant positive correlation (r = .121, p < .058)
2
. 
  
Research Question Two 
 
 
 
 The second research question asked, “What is the relationship between discursive 
network characteristics and deliberative quality rankings?”  Table 4 shows the Pearson 
“r” correlations between the quality rankings and three self-reported conversational 
                                                          
1
 Relationship is significant when tested with non-parametric Spearman “rho,” see Appendix 1 
2
 Relationship with “clarity of opinion expression” is significant when tested with non-parametric 
Spearman (rho = .128, p=.044) 
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network characteristics: frequency of political conversations, homogeneity of deliberative 
networks, and number of regular political discussion partners.   
Table 3: Correlations between Conversation Variables and Quality Rankings 
Quality 
Rankings  Talk Frequency 
Network 
Homogeneity 
Number of Regular 
Discussion Partners 
Non-Dominance 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
-0.005 -0.014 -0.049 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns p = ns p = ns 
Use of Reason 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
-0.099 0.086 0.011 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns p = ns p = ns 
Clarity of 
Opinion 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
-0.06 0.013 0.021 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns p = ns p = ns 
Comprehension 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
0.157 -0.088 0.022 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .05 p = ns p = ns 
 
The only significant correlation is between the rank of “comprehension of opposing 
viewpoints” and the frequency of political conversation.  The correlation suggests higher 
political discussion frequency predicts to a higher value on comprehension.   
 
 
Research Question Three 
 
 
 
 The third research question asked, “What is the relationship between political 
information efficacy and deliberative quality rankings?”  Table 4 presents the result of 
this correlation test. 
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Table 4: Correlations between Political 
Information Efficacy and Quality Rankings 
Quality 
Rankings  
Political Information 
Efficacy 
Non-Dominance 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
-0.129 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .05 
Use of Reason 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
.127 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .05 
Clarity of 
Opinion 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
-0.046 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns 
Comprehension 
Pearson 
Coefficient 
-0.034 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns 
 
Information efficacy significantly predicts to two of the ranking distributions.  The 
ranking of use of reason is positively related to political information efficacy (p = .127, p 
<.05), while non-dominance is negatively related to PIE (r = -0.129, p < .05). 
 The next and final chapter of the thesis will discuss an interpretation of the 
results, and will identify some of the limitations of the present study and directions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
 
 
 
 The measures employed in this thesis are somewhat experimental, and so the 
conclusions must be treated as tentative and in need of future exploration and 
explanation.  However, the results presented in chapter 4 may indicate patterns of interest 
to deliberative researchers and for future models of political discourse.   
 
Research Question One 
 
 
 
 The pairwise ranking system is designed to elicit preferences between alternatives 
when those decisions are unclear or difficult.  This incremental comparison process 
yields a series of rank coefficients, which represent the degree to which each is preferred 
over the other.  The ranking coefficients of ‘clarity’ and ‘comprehension of opposing 
viewpoints’ correlate with respondents’ positions on the cultural cognition scale.  This 
suggests that normative political preferences do relate to preferences for some of the 
discursive elements.   
 Chapter 2 established an outline of the deliberative scholarship that has very 
strong theoretical roots, but that is empirically complex and sometimes inconsistent.  This 
study is an attempt to provide an explanatory method for adding nuance to empirical 
studies, arguing that respondent’s discursive preferences are important for understanding 
how they will respond to political conversation. 
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 The strongest correlation in the results is a negative relationship between cultural 
cognition and comprehension of opposing viewpoints, where more hierarchical and 
individualistic respondents are more likely to prioritize the other elements over 
comprehension.  This may suggest that these individuals are more interested in the 
instrumental applications of political discourse, particularly in an adversarial sense, while 
the notion of using discourse for mutual understanding or consensus building is 
unappealing.  This finding may be of great relevance to the designers of deliberative 
events, particularly if they wish to maximize the perceived value and legitimacy of a 
collective decision-making process.    
 The clarity ranking is positively correlated with the cultural cognition scale, 
suggesting that more hierarchical and individualistic respondents are interested in more 
explicit opinion expression, perhaps where arguments clearly comport to known 
perspectives and arguments.  Following the assumption about the interpretations of the 
“comprehension” ranking, perhaps clear arguments lend themselves to competitive, 
rather than consensus-oriented, decision-making processes.  Learning more about the 
expectations behind clarity, perhaps as opposed to ambiguity, would explain its relative 
importance.  While clear positions are useful for adversarial argumentation, respondents 
seeking consensus may desire conversations that incorporate a fuller breadth of 
information, at the expense of simpler but clearer stances.   
 It should be clear that the results should not be used to make a generalized 
statement about the character of conservatives or liberals, Democrats or Republicans.  
They are not interpretable to mean that hierarchical individualists do not value reasoning 
and clarity in their arguments.  Rather, they reflect the priorities that each group would 
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demand of a political conversation.  In this sense, one might tentatively say that the 
strong negative “comprehension” correlation suggests that hierarchical conservatives 
believe that understanding in a conversation is less necessary than the other qualities, in 
order to have a successful political conversation.  This may indicate different 
expectations about conversational outcomes; if the outcome of political conversation is 
conceptualized as more adversarial than consensus-driving, then mutual understanding is 
perhaps less important for a successful outcome.  To verify these interpretations of the 
meanings of the rankings, future research will be required into the expectations about 
outcomes that correspond to the preference rankings; these future research suggestions 
will be discussed at greater length separately.  For the time being, the primary conclusion 
of this study is that the relative-ranking method is a potentially useful one for determining 
respondent preferences.  
 
Research Question Two 
 
 
 
As predictors of discursive quality preferences, the conversation network 
variables do not appear predictive.  The rank of “comprehension of opposing viewpoints” 
is predicted by the frequency of political conversation.  A future inquiry might potentially 
inquire how increased talk frequency raises the perceived need for comprehension, but 
the present study does not offer a theoretical explanation, and therefore the relationship is 
not a central finding of this thesis. 
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Research Question Three 
 
 
 
 The ranking of use of reason is positively related to political information efficacy 
(p = .127, p <.05).  Conceptually, information efficacy represents the degree to which a 
respondent feels comfortable and capable of employing his or her political knowledge in 
politically-salient behaviors (e.g., political discussions, voting).  What distinguishes a 
higher information efficacy ranking from general efficacy is the respondent’s specific 
confidence in his or her information itself.  It makes sense, therefore, that this higher 
confidence in information results in an increased preference for conversations that are 
grounded in rational, reason-based arguments (as opposed to heuristics). 
 Non-dominance, however, is negatively related to PIE (r = -0.129, p < .05).  This 
means lower political information efficacy responses predict to higher valuation of the 
non-dominance ranking.  Interestingly, information efficacy is also strongly correlated 
with reported general interest in politics (r=.714, p<.001).  Of the four quality rankings, 
non-dominance is also the only one to approach a significant correlation with general 
political interest (r=-.177, p=.068)
3
.  This may suggest that those who value non-
dominance the most are those who are least engaged with politics; this makes sense, as a 
competitive political conversation is more difficult to enter for those least familiar or 
interested in the topic.   
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Relationship between non-dominance and political interest is significant when tested with non-
parametric Spearman (rho = .138, p=.031) 
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Making Sense of RQ1 and RQ3: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
 
 
 
Taken together, RQ1 and RQ3 seem to provide predictors for the behavior of each of the 
four quality rankings.  A regression technique is useful for examining the influence of the 
two independent variables – cultural cognition and PIE.  The cultural cognition 
dimensions were analyzed together as predictors of each of the quality rankings, and, in 
separate analyses, PIE was also used as a predictor.  Cultural cognition and PIE are not 
correlated.  The results from the eight regression tests are summarized in Table 7.  
Statistically significant models are bolded in the table. 
 
Table 5: Regressions of Cultural Cognition and Political Information 
Efficacy (PIE) on the Four Conversation Quality Preference Rankings 
Quality  
Cultural Cognition 
(HE), (IC)* 
PIE 
 
Non-Dominance 
Std. Coefficient (β) 
Coefficient Sig. 
.14, .34 
.890, .729 
-.129 
 
Model Sig. 0.780 0.043 
Effect Size (Adj. R
2
) 0.002 0.013 
Use of Reason 
Std. Coefficient (β) 
Coefficient Sig. 
.056, .068 
.569, .489 
.127 
 
Model Sig. 0.195 0.047 
Effect Size (R
2
) 0.005 0.012 
Clarity of Opinion 
Std. Coefficient (β) 
Coefficient Sig. 
.117,  .052 
.229, .590 
-.046 
 
Model Sig. 0.043 0.470 
Effect Size (R
2
) 0.018 -.002 
Comprehension 
Std. Coefficient (β) 
Coefficient Sig. 
-.165, -.148 
.079, .115 
.034 
 
Model Sig. 0.000 0.590 
Effect Size (R
2
) 0.079 -0.003 
* (HE) = Hierarchy-Egalitarianism dimension, (IC) = Individualism-Communitarianism dimension  
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The results from the regression analysis appear to confirm the correlation tests by 
illustrating the effects of cultural cognition (where both dimensions are considered 
together) and PIE seem to influence different dimensions of deliberative preferences.  
Whether the groupings of non-dominance and use of reason, and clarity of opinion 
expression and comprehension of opposing views, represent two dimensions is a topic for 
future research.   
 A possible approach to such a future study would be to incorporate outcome 
expectancies as variables.  One political communication topic for scholars to explore is 
the difference between political discourses intended to drive consensus, and those 
intended to produce a competitive outcome.  Depending on the perceived intent of the 
conversation, or (similarly) the likely outcome, different qualities are useful.  For 
example, explicit and direct opinions are useful for adversarial arguments, where 
audience members can clearly align with one of two clear premises.  Likewise, 
comprehension of an opponent’s view is mostly unnecessary if the purpose of the 
conversation is to establish a winner, thus explaining the negative coefficients.  However, 
if the purpose is consensus, it is important that neither side dominates the other because 
aggression is more of a rhetorical heuristic than useful logical device.  Similarly, the use 
of supportable, empirical arguments (reason) is paramount for reaching an informed 
collective decision.  Yet, for adversarial purposes, too much information tends to 
compete with the clarity of an argument.  Reason and non-dominance remain somewhat 
important, but not relative to the other features. 
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Limitations 
 
 
 
 It is important to note at the outset that while several statistically significant 
relationships, meaning relationships whose patterns are unlikely due entirely to chance, 
are identified, they nearly all occur with low effect sizes.  While null hypothesis testing is 
common in social science, rejection of a null hypothesis is not in and of itself a sufficient 
result.  The reader should be cautioned that, as Levine et al. (2008) put it, “just because a 
statistical null can be rejected does not mean that the corresponding substantive 
conclusions are correct and substantive false positives are almost certainly more 
prevalent in communication research than statistical false positives” (p. 177).  
Standardized effect size is one way to improve upon the substantive meaning of a 
statistical relationship, but is highly susceptible to sample size and the nature of the 
variables itself.  It is worth noting that the dependent quality ranking variables used in 
this thesis are numerically confined to a range between about .1 and .6, because the 
rankings always sum to 1.  Consequently, the differences between ranks from case to case 
are, in absolute terms, quite small. Further, the small effects sizes could be a reflection of 
the presence of potential intervening variables and indirect effects.  In the context of 
political communication research, Iyengar (2001) talks about the small effects sizes 
typically found in persuasion research, especially in the context of political messages, and 
their effects on political behaviors. In addition, this article makes a strong case for 
examining indirect effects to better explicate the reasons behind such small effects sizes.  
Thus, the results presented in this chapter will need to be validated by more robust 
methods of analysis in future studies. 
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Future Directions 
 
 
 
 This thesis is intended as a first step toward investigating deliberation as a social 
construct.  By establishing a method for measuring the role of personal history in 
developing preferences for deliberation, it lends itself to future approaches to 
investigating civic engagement.  For example, preferences for discourse may have 
applications for perceptions and attitudes about the credibility of public debates, 
candidate selection for public office, expectations about the likely success of political 
processes, willingness to engage in political conversations (or particular types of political 
conversations), and the selection of political news sources (perhaps intra-medium, for 
example, selection of particular television programs). 
The use of the analytic hierarchy process to generate the ranking variables is a 
fairly unique application.  In its entirety, the priority vector is intended to facilitate the 
selection of competing decisions.  A broader framework employing the full AHP could 
be used to match the priority vectors to options (e.g., media types, or types of 
deliberation).  This would be of interest to scholars seeking to show that people are 
rational in their political choices, perhaps including selection among multiple information 
sources, a field of candidates, or competing proposals for public decision-making 
processes. 
Two further considerations are relevant to future applications of the AHP.  First, 
integration of the use of mathematical techniques for comparing “fuzzy numbers” is 
becoming a popular approach to calculating more precise weighted preferences vectors 
given ambiguous stated preferences, and has been applied to multi-criteria choices as 
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diverse as selecting a manufacturing supplier (Kahraman, Cebeci &Ulukan, 2003), 
evaluating weapons systems (Dağdeviren, Yavuz & Kılınç, 2009), and determining 
customer service priorities (Chan, Kwong & Dillon, 2012).  The technique would be an 
appropriate addition to the analysis presented in this thesis.  Further, the AHP has a 
companion method, the Analytic Network Process (ANP), which is more procedurally 
complex but allows for the assumption that decision points (i.e., components of the 
hierarchy) are co-dependent on the others.  The present analysis only employs one “level” 
of hierarchy (the conversation qualities), but in the event of future applications, the ANP 
rather than AHP would be the appropriate tool for a multiple hierarchies decision. 
Finally, future studies should seek to create a more complex model, where both 
the independent variables from this thesis are given predictors, and the dependent quality 
rankings are used as predictors.  Not only are cultural cognition and PIE predicted by 
other known variables, there may also be mediating variables between them and the 
deliberative quality rankings.  These rankings need further investigation and 
specification.  For example, perhaps a measure indicating ‘tolerance for ambiguity’ 
would explain the relative importance of clarity, if respondents perceive a very clear 
argument as a trade-off against more nuanced and ambiguous arguments. 
One useful concept, common in behavioral research models, is the idea that 
expectations and attitudes are predictive of behavior.  For example, Azjen’s (1985, 1988) 
theory of planned behavior holds that attitudes about a behavior, social norms, and 
perceived personal control (sometimes synonymous with efficacy) are predictive of intent 
to perform a behavior.  In a similar sense, these expectation categories may apply as 
antecedents to preferences about deliberation, or behavior within a discursive event. 
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APPENDIX 1: NON-PARAMETRIC CORRELATIONS 
Spearman Correlations Corresponding to RQ 1 & 3 Results Presented in Chapter 4 
 
 
 
*Note:  A non-parametric table is not included corresponding to table 3, testing RQ2, because no differences in 
significances occur between Pierson “r” and Spearman “rho” 
 
Non-Parametric Results  
Corresponding to Table 2 
Table 6: Correlations between Cultural Cognition and 
Conversation Quality Rankings 
Quality 
Rankings  
Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism 
Individualism-
Communitarianism 
Non-Dominance 
rho Coefficient 0.062 0.022 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns p = ns 
Use of Reason 
rho Coefficient 0.091 0.112 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns p < .05 
Clarity of 
Opinion 
rho Coefficient 0.145 0.140 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .05 p < .05 
Comprehension 
rho Coefficient -0.257 -0.250 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .001 p < .001 
 
Corresponding to Table 4 
Table 7: Correlations between Political 
Information Efficacy and Quality Rankings 
Quality 
Rankings  
Political Information 
Efficacy 
Non-Dominance 
rho Coefficient -0.176 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .01 
Use of Reason 
rho Coefficient 0.134 
Sig (2-tailed) p < .05 
Clarity of 
Opinion 
rho Coefficient -0.046 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns 
Comprehension 
rho Coefficient 0.037 
Sig (2-tailed) p = ns 
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APPENDIX 2: SURVEY 
 
 
 
*Notes:  Survey has been re-formatted for economy in the printed appendix 
Two surveys with different question orders were employed – only Version 1 is appended 
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY 
INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Political Conversation Preferences 
David Brinker, Jr. 
College of Communication 
You have been asked to complete the following research survey. It should take no more than 30 minutes for you to 
complete the survey. The purpose of this study is to learn how people prioritize the qualities of their everyday political 
conversations. Your responses are strictly anonymous and your participation is completely voluntary. By completing 
the survey, you are giving your permission to the researcher to use your anonymous responses at professional meetings 
and in research publications. 
Thank you for your participation. 
David Brinker 
Graduate Student 
Marquette University, College of Communication 
 
Political Conversations 
This study asks for your opinion about political discussions and politics in general.  All identifying 
information will be disassociated from the data prior to analysis.  Thank you for participating. 
Skipping questions that you do not wish to answer will not necessarily result in a rejection of the work, but 
surveys with more than three skipped answers will not receive approval.  Marking "I do not wish to 
answer" is not considered a skipped question. 
Questions 1-7 ask you to compare two statements about everyday political conversations.  The two 
statements describe qualities of a political conversation.  Please indicate which quality you think is more 
important when having political conversations with other people.  The same wording appears more than 
once - this is part of the method used in the survey.  Please compare each pair, even if the questions 
seem redundant. 
1. To you, is "Statement A" more important or less important than "Statement B" 
Statement A: Participants do not dominate the conversation, and are not overbearing. 
Statement B: Participants express their positions clearly and directly and are very explicit about their 
opinions. 
 
Much More Important Slightly More Important  
Equal/No Opinion 
Slightly Less Important Much Less Important 
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2. To you, is "Statement A" more important or less important than "Statement B" 
Statement A: Participants back up their arguments with evidence, and present sensible arguments in support 
of their views. 
Statement B: Participants do not dominate the conversation, and are not overbearing. 
 
Much More Important Slightly More Important  
Equal/No Opinion 
Slightly Less Important Much Less Important 
3. To you, is "Statement A" more important or less important than "Statement B" 
Statement A: Participants express their positions clearly and directly and are very explicit about their 
opinions. 
Statement B: Participants back up their arguments with evidence, and present sensible arguments in support 
of their views. 
 
Much More Important Slightly More Important  
Equal/No Opinion 
Slightly Less Important Much Less Important 
 
4. To you, is "Statement A" more important or less important than "Statement B" 
Statement A: Participants do not dominate the conversation, and are not overbearing. 
Statement B: Participants understand the reasons behind each other's views, and recognize the values 
underlying the other person's point of view. 
 
Much More Important Slightly More Important  
Equal/No Opinion 
Slightly Less Important Much Less Important 
5. To you, is "Statement A" more important or less important than "Statement B" 
Statement A: Participants understand the reasons behind each other's views, and recognize the values 
underlying the other person's point of view. 
Statement B: Participants express their positions clearly and directly and are very explicit about their 
opinions. 
 
Much More Important Slightly More Important  
Equal/No Opinion 
Slightly Less Important Much Less Important 
6. To you, is "Statement A" more important or less important than "Statement B" 
Statement A: Participants back up their arguments with evidence, and present sensible arguments in support 
of their views. 
Statement B: Participants understand the reasons behind each other's views, and recognize the values 
underlying the other person's point of view. 
 
Much More Important Slightly More Important  
Equal/No Opinion 
Slightly Less Important Much Less Important 
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7. To you, is "Statement A" more important or less important than "Statement B" 
Statement A: Participants do not dominate the conversation, and are not overbearing. 
Statement B: Participants back up their arguments with evidence, and present sensible arguments in support 
of their views.  
 
Much More Important Slightly More Important  
Equal/No Opinion 
Slightly Less Important Much Less Important 
 
Questions 8 - 37 ask your opinion about political issues.  There is no right or wrong answer to any of 
these questions. 
8. It seems like the criminals and welfare cheats get all the breaks, while the average citizen picks up 
the tab. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
9. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
10. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
11. Nowadays it seems like there is just as much discrimination against whites as there is against 
blacks. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
12. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don’t want equal rights, they want 
special rights just for them. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
13. A lot of problems in our society today come from the decline in the traditional family, where the 
man works and the woman stays home. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
14. The women’s rights movement has gone too far. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
15. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
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16. It’s old-fashioned and wrong to think that one culture’s set of values is better than any other 
culture’s way of seeing the world. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
17. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of 
color, and men and women. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
18. Parents should encourage young boys to be more sensitive and less “rough and tough.” 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
19. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
20. We live in a sexist society that is fundamentally set up to discriminate against women. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
21. People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
22. If the government spent less time trying to fix everyone’s problems, we’d all be a lot better off. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
23. Government regulations are almost always a waste of everyone’s time and money. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
24. The government interferes far too much in our every day lives. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
25. Free markets--not government programs--are the best way to supply people with the things they 
need. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
26. Too many people today expect society to do things for them that they should be doing for 
themselves. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
27. It’s a mistake to ask society to help every person in need. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
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28. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
29. Private profit is the main motive for hard work. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
30. It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from themselves. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
31. Society works best when it lets individuals take responsibility for their own lives without telling 
them what to do. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
32. Our government tries to do too many things for too many people. We should just let people take 
care of themselves. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
33. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
34. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don’t get in the way of 
what’s good for society. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
35. It’s society’s responsibility to make sure everyone’s basic needs are met. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
36. The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means limiting the 
freedom and choices of individuals. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
37. People should be able to rely on the government for help when they need it. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
Questions 38-41 ask for information about your political involvement.  
38. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
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39. I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
40. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
41. If a friend asked me about the presidential election, I feel I would have enough information to 
help my friend figure out who to vote for. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
In a political conversation with another person, it is important that: 
 42. Participants do not dominate the conversation, and are not overbearing. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
43. Participants express their positions clearly and directly and are very explicit about their opinions. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
44. Participants back up their arguments with evidence, and present sensible arguments in support 
of their views. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
45. Participants understand the resons behind each other's views, and recognize the values 
underlying the other person's point of view. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
Questions 46-50 are agree/disagree: 
 46. Political discussions alienate friends and disrupts social relations. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
47. Political discussion is inappropriate when people have little in common. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
48. Political discussion is inappropriate when the discussion will not be civil. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
49. Political discussion is not a normal part of my regular interaction with my friends and social 
groups. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
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50. I usually discuss politics with people of the same ethnic, social, and economic background as 
myself. 
Strongly Agree       Agree       Neutral       Disagree       Strongly Disagree 
The remaining questions ask for information about you: 
 51. On average, how often do you talk about political topics with your family, friends, neighbors, 
and co-workers? 
More than once a day 
Once a day 
Once a week 
Once a month 
Once every 2 months 
Once every 4 months 
Less than once every 4 months 
Don't know 
52. How many family members, friends, neighbors, and co-workers do you regularly discuss politics 
with? 
Enter number ______ 
53. How interested would you say you are in politics? 
Very interested       Fairly interested       Not very interested       Not at all interested  
Don't know 
54. Which comes closest to representing your political philosophy? 
Very Liberal 
Somewhat Liberal 
Moderate 
Somewhat Conservative 
Very Conservative 
55. With which political party do you identify? 
[Select one] 
Democratic 
Republican 
Tea Party 
Independent Party* 
No Affiliation 
Other – If Other, please indicate here: ______________ 
 
*Combined with “No Affiliation,” because respondents did not seem to distinguish between state Independent parties and 
non-affiliation 
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56. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
[Select one] 
No High School 
Some High School 
High School Graduate 
Some college, no degree 
Associates Degree 
Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate, etc) 
57. In what year were you born? 
Enter year: __________ 
58. What is your sex? 
[Select one] 
Male 
Female 
I do not wish to share this information 
59. What is your ethnic origin or race? 
[Select one] 
Black/African American 
Hispanic 
Asian or Pacific Islander 
American Indian 
White 
Other 
I do not wish to share this information 
60. What is the total income of your household? 
[Select one] 
Less than $12,500 
12,500-24,999 
25,000-37,499 
37,500-49,999 
50,000-62,499 
62,500-74,999 
75,000-87,499 
87,500-99,999 
$100,000 or More 
61. Please provide any comments you may have below - we appreciate your input! 
[Free-response comment box provided]  
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APPENDIX 3: ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS ILLUSTRATION 
 
 
